

JPRS-WER-84-009

24 JANUARY 1984

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

24 January 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

FINLAND

Moscow Hard Liners Gaining Ascendancy in Communist Party (Ilkka Juva; UUSI SUOMI, 5 Nov 83)	1
SKDL Chairman Kivistö Urges Rejoining of Government (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 15 Dec 83)	9
Chairmen of SKDL, Conservatives Liked Least by Voters (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 23 Dec 83)	11
Sorsa Viewed as Likely Presidential Candidate in Future (Jan-Magnus Jansson; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 23 Dec 83)	13
Appearance of New Joint CP Paper Occurs in Midst of Crisis (Jukka Knuuti; UUSI SUOMI, 7 Nov 83)	15
CP Chairman Kananoja Describes Goals of New CP Newspaper (Editorial; YHTEISTYÖ, 4 Nov 83)	17

GREECE

Local Citizens' Questions Put to Interior Minister (ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 7, 8 Nov 83)	20
ND Youth Organization's Leaders, Cadres (KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 13 Nov 83)	27

NETHERLANDS

VVD's Nijpels on Relations With CDA, PVDA (Ed Nijpels Interview; HET VRIJE VOLK, 7 Dec 83)	31
---	----

Crisis in Christian Democratic Appeal Party (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 15 Dec 83)	39
SPAIN	
Lawyers' Letter Critical of Interior Minister's Conduct (EL PAIS, 10 Dec 83)	41
Extremadura Leader Proposes Regional Policies (YA, 13 Dec 83)	44
Fontan Sets Conditions for Liberal-Popular Coalition Merger (Jose A. Sentis; ABC, 13 Dec 83)	46
MILITARY	
BELGIUM	
Vreven's Personnel Plan for 1984-1986 Criticized (Frank de Moor; KNACK, 16 Nov 83)	48
SPAIN	
Anxiety Over Reform Impact of Military's 'Political' Role (EL ALCAZAR, 16 Nov 83)	53
Allocations To Overhaul Rota Naval Base (Jose Luis Medina; YA, 17 Dec 83)	57
Madrid in Consortium for New Fighter (ABC, 17 Dec 83)	58
Ecologists Hamper Cabaneros Bomb Range Purchase (Fernando Rueda; YA, 17 Dec 83)	59
ECONOMIC	
CYPRUS	
Economist Gives Mixed Review of Cypriot Status (Giorgos Vasileiou ; O FILELEVTHEROS, 18 Nov 83)	61
Activities of Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation (KHARAVGI, 20 Nov 83)	65
Briefs	
Lebanese Bank in Cyprus	66
GREECE	
Comment Critical of Government 'Dictatorship' Over Unions (Editorial; AKROPOLIS, 11 Oct 83)	67

Poll Shows Economy Tops Greek Concerns
(ENA, 27 Oct 83) 69

SPAIN

Moratorium Agreement on Part of Equatorial Guinea Debt
(ABC, 13 Dec 83) 72

Underground Water Resources Nationalization
(ABC, 13 Dec 83) 73

SWITZERLAND

Banks Predict Economic Growth for 1984
(NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 10 Dec 83) 75

MOSCOW HARD LINERS GAINING ASCENDANCY IN COMMUNIST PARTY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 5 Nov 83 pp 20-21

[Commentary by Ilkka Juva]

[Text] Finnish Communists have turned in their membership books for new ones and in this process nearly 20,000 members have been excluded from the party. This exchange strengthens pro-Soviet positions in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. This exchange could in the near future result in the separation of the SKP and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. The SKDL's Socialists and Communists not belonging to the SKP have expressed forceful judgments according to which cooperation with the Communists is becoming impossible.

A new rupture in the political extreme leftwing will occur in such a way that either the SKDL will suspend the SKP from its membership or the SKDL's Socialists and other non-Communists as well as the SKP's majority members will establish a new party. In the first case a congress will be demanded of the SKDL, in which the mandate principle will be given up in the election of leadership organs since only then can it possible to weaken the effect of the SKP leadership in the SKDL.

Chairman Jouko Kajanoja and Taisto Sinisalo, chairman of the International Department are today smiling broader than yesterday since the exchange of SKP membership books has succeeded as expected: the vast majority of those supporting the rebellious axing-policy line have called it quits without so much as a whimper.

General Arvo Aalto's smile is slightly more uncertain even though the exchange of books was conducted on the part of the majority under his personal supervision. Aalto's hold on the majority has become stronger, but there is no confidence in the minority. This was made clear by Sinisalo in an interview given to SAVON SANOMAT when he demanded a new general secretary. Aalto is rapidly falling into his own trap.

Officially there are now 33,052 members in the SKP and according to estimates, the actual figure is probably around 27,000. At the end of last year as the exchange of membership books began, the official membership was reported at 48,704. At that time the number of those who had paid their dues was only approximately 25,000.

No major change occurred in the mutual relations between the majority and minority spheres since the minority improved its position by only 0.2 percent. The majority now represents 56.8 percent of the membership, the minority 43.2 percent. The situation would have been different if ghost members of the majority offered from Helsinki had not been rejected in certain districts. This would have meant a full 1,000 more members in the majority districts. Then the results would have appeared as a slight advancement for the majority in this mutual competition as in the past.

Rebels Turned Their Backs

The most important change in the SKP will not show up from the statistics involving the exchange of membership books since it occurred within the majority and no one has the exact comparative figures.

This change involves the drastic reduction of support in the SKP rank and file for the rebellious majority movement, which was named the axing-policy movement. This, for its part, means a final turn backward for the SKP from the path of national communism opened up in the middle of the 1960's.

This year's exchange of membership books has ensured the SKP's return to the bosom of the party of its eastern neighbor. The rebels have turned their backs in disgust since they consider that the majority-controlled secretariat has abandoned the premises of the national policy which brought forth a breakthrough in the 1960's.

Aalto Demanded An Exchange

A little less than 2 years ago it was realized in the SKP that the pages intended for noting the payment of dues in the membership books issued in 1973 will run out in 1983. At that time there arose a discussion on whether the membership books should be exchanged or whether additional pages should be printed to extend the life of the old membership books by 4 years.

In the majority faction it was considered that since party support was badly declining, there was no reason to accelerate this process by cutting back the membership. A postponement was considered self-evident. The minority was not at all interested in an exchange of membership books.

Both factions had a clear understanding that their power relationships cannot be changed even if membership books were to be exchanged every year. In each district office there is a sufficient ability to read, write, and count in order to find membership books from the desk drawer if the number of membership books in the pockets of actual members is not sufficient. Thus there seemed to be no sense in entering into a confrontation over this matter.

To many it seemed surprising that General Secretary Aalto stubbornly demanded the exchange of membership books contrary to the opinions of several majority members of the Politburo and majority district secretaries. He was joined by Kajanoja, who had just been elected chairman. With a shaking of heads and some indecision the exchange was approved in the majority faction.

Objective Was A Purge

Many still have not awakened to what was actually in question.

Each exchange of membership books means a purge in the SKP in so far as those who are not satisfied with the actions of the party leadership and have withdrawn from active participation or have become apathetic and have not paid their membership dues always drop out of the party in connection with such an exchange.

55,000 Have Left

When the figures are turned around to reveal the number of those who have given up their membership, the extent of this phenomenon is clearly reflected in the statistics, according to which approximately 37,000 new members have joined the SKP in the last 20 years. During this whole period party membership has remained rather stable at around 45,000--50,000.

When the nearly 20,000 people who left the party in connection with the exchange of membership books this year are added to this figure, it can be confirmed that approximately 55,000 people have left the SKP in the last 20 years.

Since we know that during this same period the composition of personnel in the party leadership and office has remained pretty much the same except for the recent change of chairmen, we have before us a clear picture of the content and significance of this vast turnover of membership. Those who have retained their membership throughout all the trials are those who are faithful to the party leadership and who may at times grit their teeth, but will blindly follow the commands of the party leadership.

Victory Celebrations in Cultural House

The general secretary and the secretariat directed by him understand this quite well and now they have reason to be satisfied: this faithful group of people is now once again in the majority and it will now be easy to overcome the rebels. What could better complement this picture than party Information Chief Oiva Bjorkback's open attack against Arvo Kemppainen and Oulu District Secretary Antti Kivimaki in a recent issue of KANSAN UUTISET. Bjorkback's tone of voice is triumphant.

The joy seems to be justified since in Helsinki as well as in the districts of central Finland and even northern Finland since the active younger generation of the majority in particular -- those who joined at the end of the 1960's and in the 1970's and who played a central role in directing the primary organizations -- has not renewed its membership.

Minority in A Strong Position

The Communist minority, which continues to be directed by Taisto Sinisalo has also experienced internal trials and there continue to be problems between Sinisalo and Uusimaa District Secretary Markus Kainulainen. The

minority has now, however, acquired some new impetus in proportion to the dissolution of the majority and it is also smoothing out the mutual power struggle in the minority faction: there seems to be enough room for everyone at the top.

In the exchange of membership books the minority continued to remain on the side in organizational readiness. Now it is preparing a final operation for assuming complete control of the party. The minority leadership is laughing delightedly at those childish members of the majority who imagined that it was possible to make compromises with the Stalinists on the basis of mutual concessions. A self-respecting Stalinist will not surrender before he has everything under his control.

Dropping of Members

The number of SKP members has now in the present exchange of membership books fallen off more drastically than in any previous exchange of membership books. For example, in the exchange in 1964 the membership was reduced by only 5,000 and in 1973 the number of members dropped was only 10,000. Now the SKP has lost nearly 20,000 members even according to official figures.

The situation is further colored by the fact that the party is obtaining fewer and fewer new members. For example, 3,347 new members joined the SKP in 1973 when membership books were exchanged, but this year membership books have been issued to only 300--400 new members. In 1974 more than 5,000 new members joined the SKP, in 1975 nearly 3,000, in 1976 [sic] approximately 2,500, but in 1978 there were only 1,600, and in 1981 only 847 joined the party. Last year was the bleakest in all the years that party membership statistics have been kept since only 443 new members joined the party.

The above demonstrates that the SKP now has no prospects for any kind of resurgence. The party is losing its mass support as well as its organizational base, which has been considered to be strong.

The party leadership's games at the expense of the People's Democratic press and also its other concessions to the Stalinist minority directed from the outside are resulting in the fact that the majority, which values Finnish national traditions and the party's independence, is turning its back more and more on the SKP. The SKDL's Socialists and People's Democrats not belonging to the SKP are already expressing opinions to the effect that cooperation with the Communists is becoming impossible as present development becomes stronger. If this happens, the SKP will die as a national political force.

Uolevi Mattila

Mattila, a writer, worked for several years as an employee of the SKP's information section. He was fired from this job in August of this year for economic reasons. After this, Mattila also gave up his party membership. He belonged to the so-called axing-policy line.

A Communist Dictionary

If the SKDL's parliamentary faction were now to be divided into two factions, then one half -- the Communists -- would have 15 MP's and the Socialist half would have 12.

The situation after the next parliamentary elections cannot be predicted. Either half could become the larger faction, which would take all the party support for itself.

The SKP is already divided into three rather clearly delineated factions with their own distinctive features: Taistoites, followers of Kajanoja, and axing-policy line members. Since in addition to this, a Socialist faction operates within the framework of the SKP--SKDL, the People's Democratic parliamentary faction can be divided into four different factions.

The Taistoites already make up a traditional faction and have been known since the time of the SKP split nearly 20 years ago. The Taistoites adhere to the traditions of communism directed from Moscow and have received the additional names of dogmatists and Stalinists.

The Saarinen faction dating from the same period has become dissolved in the turmoil of the last couple years and it was subsequently become aligned either with Kajanoja or the axing-policy line. The followers of Kajanoja primarily represent the SKP's party office and the third-line thinking developed a couple years ago. Their premise is the building of SKP unity in a way that the economic and political support of the fraternal party in the East could be retained, which in practice means a submission to the demands and power aspirations of the minority and a drifting toward ever more serious conflicts with the SKDL.

The axing-policy line, for its part, represents the majority of the majority's rank and file in spite of its malicious appellation, and its democratic rights are represented by a faction which is characterized by an emphasis on party independence and national values. The appellation was given to it by the minority with the intent of shaking off the label of axing communism from itself. The axing-policy line proceeds from the concept that it is better to suspend the whole minority from the party than to submit to its dictated conditions and to the compulsory marriage demanded by the fraternal party.

As an organized faction the SKDL's Socialists are a small group, but they represent a rather broad segment of the SKDL's rank and file. In the SKDL there are presently more than 20,000 members who do not belong the SKP or so-called People's Democrats and this group is quite faithful to Kalevi Kivistö.

Inasmuch as the SKP makes a decision at next spring's congress in one direction or another, it will be followed by a division of the People's Democratic movement along new lines. The Taistoites and the followers of Kajanoja will remain on one side to control the SKP and members of the axing-policy line

and the Socialists will unite their forces on the other side to strengthen the SKDL as an independent party.

The Fronts Are Dispersing

Being in opposition has decisively changed the mutual positions of the quarreling factions in the Finnish Communist Party. The Taistoites -- the traditional minority -- and the "supporters of Kajanoja", who are promoting harmony with them, are now running the show. The "axing-policy line", which is seeking to expel the Taistoites, and the SKDL find themselves in strained circumstances.

If the SKP splits at next spring's party congress -- as is the custom to make wagers before congresses -- the faction departing will be the party's "right-wing". The class-conscious Communists will keep the SKP for themselves and others who will want to remain in it will have to be satisfied with the role of a silent stockholder.

Things Happen Silently

It has been said that things happen in the SKP when it is quiet. Preparations for the congress are now being made in silence. The elements are sufficient for a final dissolution as well as for the development of party unity.

Even though the position of opposition is calming the situation in the SKP, the resolution of party conflicts will be extremely difficult. In addition to issues, there are also disputes between individuals. Another -- even greater -- problem is that the SKP is incapable of an independent solution. A strong fraternal party and communist tradition hover in the background. On the other hand, for example, the Social Democrats could at any time destroy the budding harmony by offering the Communists government cooperation.

Also harmonious development cannot help but be impeded by the fact that there is no one in the SKP who is better qualified than anyone else to assume the leadership. Jouko Kajanoja is a tolerable compromise and his only possible rival Veikko Saarto is not any better.

Fronts Are Broken

The traditional split into the majority and the minority is no longer valid. Taistoite assessments talk about a new mathematical majority, which in addition to themselves includes the followers of Kajanoja. On the other side is the axing-policy line, "which is striving to drive the Taistoites out of the party by organizational means".

The majority assessment is more obvious and presumably more correct. According to it, the self-criticism of party work, which all parties have experienced, now also applies to the SKP. From this comes a new, searching, and multifaceted spectrum of individuals and procedures.

The factional division, which was reinforced in 1970, thus continues to remain formally in effect. On the other hand, the fronts are not holding, but a continuous movement superimposes itself over them. This would become more evident if an organizational split were to occur. A split would not be reflected in a straight line, but it would be a meandering break with ragged edges.

Newspaper Question -- Simsabim

At the next congress one issue -- the press question -- will be essential. Next to this, the election of the party leadership will be of secondary importance.

Taisto Sinisalo with his groups assumes that the Communist Party will have an undivided organ of the press. KANSAN UUTISET, which is published jointly with the SKDL, is not acceptable.

The weekly newspaper experiment initiated by a decision of the Central Committee and its expansion into a daily paper will in the opinion of the majority's majority in time kill TIEDONANTAJA and through it Taistoite parallel activity.

The axing-policy line, on the other hand, would suffocate parallel activity by organizational means and would not consent to any kind of cooperation with the Taistoites.

Thus when one talks about a newspaper, one also talks about the party.

The issue would appear to be clear. The weekly YHTEISTYÖ will begin publication in November and will later be expanded into a daily paper. But the congress will not be able to stop the publication of TIEDONANTAJA. TIEDONANTAJA is protected by the law and the SKP's own regulations.

Sinisalo will not allow the newspaper to cease publication until he knows that the whole party is following the line he wants it to follow.



The establishment of a new newspaper is thus not a simsabim-trick by which harmony will be created, but a transitional phase in the power struggle.

Axing-Policy Line's Difficulties

The SKDL's parliamentary faction, which split immediately after the last parliamentary elections -- to the disappointment of the axing-policy line -- now appears to be an undivided entity. Also the Communists appeared in the same election alliance for the first time since the party split in the elections of the Metal Workers's Union.

Thus there are examples pointing to a unification process. Unless the SKDL is pulled into the government in the near future or is persuaded to become a supporter of government policy, there will be a more unified Communist Party in this country after the congress.

For the time being it cannot be predicted whether the price of this unity will be the birth of a new party between the SKP and the SDP -- to say nothing of its capacity to survive. The writing above [A Communist Dictionary] by Uolevi Mattila -- a former axing-policy party functionary -- indicates that the harassed axing-policy line will not take too many new blows.



1) New Members

- 1) Members in SKP Rank and File Organizations
 - 2) Now
 - 3) Total

1) SKDL:N EDUSKUNTARYHMÄN JAKAUTUMINEN FRAKTIOIHIN:	2)	3)	4)	5)
Taistelaiset:		Kajanojalaiset:		sosialistit:
Matti Kautto		Ulla-Leena Alppi		Esko Helle
Mikko Kuoppa		Heli Astala		Kalevi Kivistö
Ensio Laine		Inger Hirvelä		Lauha Mannistö
Irma Rosnell		Heikki Mustonen		
Marja-Liisa Salminen		Veikko Saarto		
Marjatta Stenius		Pirkko Turpeinen		
Sten Söderström				
Esko Tennilä				
Seppo Toivainen				

- 1) SKDL Parliamentary Group Factions
 - 2) Taistointes
 - 3) Kajano ja-Line
 - 4) Axing Line
 - 5) Socialists

10,576
CSO: 3617/47

SKDL CHAIRMAN KIVISTO URGES REJOINING OF GOVERNMENT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Dec 83 p 12

[Text] Chairman of the Finnish People's Democratic League [SKDL] Kalevi Kivistö supported general secretary Arvo Aalto's recommendation that cooperation between the Left and the middle should be resumed at the government level after the municipal election. The results of the work of recent weeks in the Parliament clearly show, according to Kivistö, how disastrous it was from the SKDL standpoint to leave government power in the hands of the Social Democrats and the nonsocialist middle.

Kivistö took up the question at the meeting of the SKDL leadership on Wednesday.

"In certain connections it has been considered that policy would impede co-operation. The contents of policy are, however, influenced substantially by which bloc has governing power," said Kivistö.

When one first tries to build up cooperation there are possibilities to discuss this question, he said.

According to Kivistö the labor movement long ago passed the stage where it discussed whether it can try to influence issues in the institutions of the nonsocialist community. Kivistö said that in order to realize SKDF's goals, there must be influence over all decisions.

'Existing Base Breaking Up'

In a resolution on Wednesday the leadership of the People's Democrats said that government cooperation between the Left and the middle is still the best alternative.

Many signs indicate that it is the opinion of the leadership that the existing government base will not hold together until the next parliamentary election.

"If the Conservative Party joins in the government that will further strengthen the government's reactionary policies," said the leadership.

The Social Democrats and the middle groups in the government are accused of conducting so-called practical politics which see social problems as technical questions and people as subjects.

"The Social Democrats and the middle forces have made statesmanlike insensitivity into a virtue," claimed the People's Democrats in their resolution.

The leadership also desires further special legislation about state companies, and urged a decision on principle by the government about their development.

In principle the People's Democrats claim that state companies in which the activities are stabilized should be profitable.

"The companies should, however, be prepared to take risks in the direction of new and perhaps trial production. If state companies are subjected to special obligations for national economic or employment reasons, the nation should be responsible for the costs resulting therefrom," said the resolution by the People's Democrats.

9287
CSO: 3650/82

CHAIRMEN OF SKDL, CONSERVATIVES LIKED LEAST BY VOTERS

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 83 p 13

[Article: "Party Chairmen's Popularity Investigated--Suominen, Kajanoja Are the Lowest"]

[Text] Party chairman Kalevi Sorsa, who said he will leave his post in 1987, has stronger support among the non-socialist voters than among his own. This was disclosed by a poll published in the latest number of the newspaper APU. APU has had Taloustutkimus OY interview 987 Finns to ascertain the support of the party chairmen and their closest competitors in the major parties.

Not entirely surprisingly, Pekka Venamo is the most popular party leader. Of those who say they support FLP [Finnish Rural Party], 54 percent want P. Venamo to remain. He is also relatively unchallenged ahead of Minister of Labor and party secretary Urpo Leppanen, who received only 12 percent.

Further down are both Ilkka Suominen, SAML [Conservative Party] and Jouko Kajanoja, FKP [Finnish Communist Party]. Kajanoja is supported by only 26 percent of his own party, while Suominen enjoys the support of 29 percent of his. Challengers from both parties also did well. Arvo Aalto, and FKP's general secretary and minority communist MP Esko Juhani Tennila are both 13 percent, while Veikko Saarto follows with 6 percent.

Within the Conservative Party, Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi had 22 percent supporters, and Suominen's challenger at the party congress in Lahtis last summer, MP Pertti Salolainen had 20 percent. Put the two together and Suominen looks rather scrubby.

Vayrynen Unthreatened

Taloustutkimus' results awakened a certain surprise, at least concerning the Center and Social Democratic Parties. Paavo Vayrynen, C [Center Party] received 47 percent support from his own party, and Minister of Finance Ahti Pekkala received 15. On the other hand the popular and considered up-and-coming Seppo Kaariainen received only 4 percent. At the same time as Vayrynen received 47 percent from his own party, 46 percent were against him!

It is not altogether clear how Taloustutkimus posed its poll questions. Obviously, for example, Kaariainen would have received a significantly higher percentage if the question was asked about popular politicians in general, rather than concomitant with the question of replacing the chairman.

Sorsa the Favorite of FLP!

The same thing applied to the SDP. In that party 38 percent want Kalevi Sorsa to remain. But the Conservatives supported Sorsa with 42 percent. It is also surprising that he received 52 percent of the FLP sympathizers, although he has long been criticized by Papa Vennamos.

Pirkko Tyolajarvi also received surprisingly little support from her party, in which 11 percent believe in her as a challenger. She is still, however, the number one challenger within the SDP.

The poll, which is therefore a little sloppy in its documentation, gives a clear indication of who can take it easy and which chairmen must start looking after their affairs.

9287
CSO: 3650/82

SORSA VIEWED AS LIKELY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN FUTURE

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Sorsa Lifts the Veil"]

[Text] Kalevi Sorsa has let it be known in an interview that he will gradually leave the "main roles of politics" to others. Jan-Magnus Jansson comments.

Before the 1982 presidential election we wrote in this column that Kalevi Sorsa has a great chance of being the strong man in Koivisto's republic. Sorsa did not want to be recognized as such. Today his power position in the republic is so obvious that neither genuine nor false shyness any longer require that he reject this designation. A new aspect is that Sorsa also is accepted as a statesman across party lines. Previously, of course, he had a reputation of being a confirmed party man. His identification with social democracy has hardly weakened, but it is clear that the leadership of four coalition governments has influenced a receptive personality.

Since Sorsa has been fairly uncommunicative about his future views and his private plans, a certain amount of attention was created when in an interview in yesterday's TURUN SANOMAT he let it be known that he plans gradually to leave the "main roles of politics" to others. He did not say what these main rolls are. He only specified that he would prefer a 3-year period as party chairman and to influence the formation of the program of party principles which is being worked on. The next party congress will be held in the spring, which means that Sorsa would be at the head of the party 1984-1987. There will also be a Parliamentary election in 1987, which for him can mean a decision on continued membership in the Parliament.

The positions at the head of the party and the Parliament are the formal democratic bases for the national political power that Sorsa has exercised for years as one of our most influential heads of government. Sorsa is not one of the politicians who need to toss out threats of resignation in order to strengthen their influence. One should therefore believe that the need

gradually to step down is genuine with him. He certainly is one of those who went from the schoolroom into politics. When in 1969 Paasio handpicked him as party secretary, he had a career behind him as an international functionary. In spite of that Sorsa has reached the top posts in politics at a relatively young age, and also with him the factors of fatigue and the desire for change can exist, even if the public career has not weakened him physically or mentally.

Sorsa has been the Social Democratic Party chairman for 8 years. Obviously there are chairman candidates standing in line behind him waiting their turn. According to the newspaper APUS yesterday, Pirkko Tyolajarvi and Matti Ahde will collect the votes after Sorsa; the latter appears today to be a more rapidly rising star than the former.

Even if Sorsa wants to retire, perhaps for more humanitarian pursuits, that does not mean that circumstances will permit it. If Mauno Koivisto intends to limit his time as president to 12 years, which he himself has said, that means that Sorsa can be a credible presidential candidate within a decade. Perhaps it is realization of that which is causing Sorsa to seek a period of quiet while it is still possible.

Whether Sorsa's plan to retire will be carried out or not, it again shows that the time of the longtime parliamentarian is past. Members of the Parliament, as such, no longer have the importance that would entice those who have swiftly attained political prominence. One is reminded of how Par Stenback, who was considerably younger than Sorsa, some years ago let it be known that he was planning gradually to leave politics. An intensive, time-limited investment which swallows the entire personality, and later is replaced by a quieter existence with the possibility of "finding oneself," is becoming the pattern for ranking politicians in today's society.

9287
CSO: 3650/82

APPEARANCE OF NEW JOINT CP PAPER OCCURS IN MIDST OF CRISIS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 7 Nov 83 p 2

[Commentary by Jukka Knuuti]

[Text] "You are holding in your hands a new newspaper in the history of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. In concrete terms, but also in allegorical terms. The party would not have made a decision to establish a new newspaper if it had not wanted something new." It is with such eloquence that SKP Chairman Jouko Kajanoja writes in YHTEISTYÖ [Cooperation], in the advance publication of the party's new organ.

At the same time that KANSAN UUTISET, the joint organ of the SKP and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], has had to reduce its staff and the SKDL's Swedish-language paper NY TID is alternately laying off its editors for 3 months, people are wondering from where the money will come for a new paper when even the old ones are experiencing difficulties. No less amazement has been expressed by the publishers of People's Democratic newspapers.

Also they have wondered from where a sufficient circulation will be obtained for the new paper. Indeed, the plans call for approximately 20,000 subscribers. On the other hand, however, opinion polls indicate for the second time already that the SKDL's support has dropped to the same level as that of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party].

Also the information that SKP membership was reduced by a full 20,000 members in the last exchange of membership books down to 33,000 members, but in reality is estimated to be even 5,000--6,000 members less, does not promise very bright prospects for the future circulation of the new newspaper.

Since in many instances there are obviously two members of the SKP from the same family, a circulation of 20,000 issues would mean that, practically speaking, each household in which there are Communist members would subscribe to the new newspaper.

In many cases each subscription to YHTEISTYÖ would obviously mean a loss of one subscription to KANSAN UUTISET since actual new subscribers will most

likely not be found for the newspaper of a party that is in decline. However, this will hardly cause any regrets for the members of the minority, for whom one purpose of the realization of the new paper has been to reduce the significance of KANSAN UUTISET.

There is one announcement in the advance publication of YHTEISTYÖ. It talks about the 20th Congress of the SKP to be held in Helsinki next spring. At that congress the intent will be, among other things, to adopt a decision that YHTEISTYÖ will be merged with the minority paper TIEDONANTAJA and in this connection YHTEISTYÖ will be made into a daily newspaper appearing four times a week. In addition to Chairman Kajanoja, there are probably very few who believe this will happen. It is doubtful that the Taistoties will give up their own TIEDONANTAJA before they are absolutely sure that the new newspaper is being published in accordance with their policies.

From this point on we can only follow what will happen in the Communist press. Many interesting details will most certainly have been recorded in the history of the Finnish press before KANSAN UUTISET, YHTEISTYÖ, and TIEDONANTAJA have each made their own positions clear sometime in the future.

10576
CSO: 3617/47

CP CHAIRMAN KANANOJA DESCRIBES GOALS OF NEW CP NEWSPAPER

Helsinki YHTEISTYO in Finnish 4 Nov 83, Advance Publication Edition No 1,
p 2

[Editorial: "New Newspaper in History of Finnish Communist Party"]

[Text] You are holding in your hands a new newspaper in the history of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. In concrete terms, but also in allegorical terms. The party would not have made a decision to establish a new newspaper if it had not wanted something new. What is this something new?

The answer is, of course, quite multifaceted. I will compress it into four subject segments.

It is a question of the Communist Party in Finland, of tasks set forth for the party in a new social situation for the building of a better Finland.

It is a question of unity and a new life for the party.

It is a question of the whole People's Democratic movement, of the conditions for its revival.

It is a question of the SKP's congress next spring, of its democratic preparations and decisions so that they will mean the confirmation of a new spring for the party and the signs of spring for all of society.

I will continue in the order described.

Communists and The Social Situation

The United States and the Soviet Union have reached unanimity on one issue. The scientists of both countries are unanimous with respect to the fact that a full-scale nuclear war would annihilate a billion and a half people in a matter of approximately 10 minutes. The consequence, among other things, would be an ice age on the earth with an average temperature of 10-20 degrees below zero as a result of the damage caused to the ozone layer surrounding the earth. The threat of nuclear war is greater than ever since World War II, and the new Euro-missiles are increasing this threat. Such a situation places social action in a new order, an incalculable value to be placed on actions for peace.

A continuation of the current direction of production will result in the ecological destruction of the world. The optimism of developing countries has turned out to be an illusion, the differences in development are becoming increasingly more acute. The crisis in the economy of the capitalist world, which began in the middle of the 1970's, is continuing without any prospects of a new... [text incomplete]

Unity

The SKP has well-known and extensively published internal problems. There have always been and always will be diverse opinions and directions in this party. This is not a problem, but a wealth. But the problem has been and is that divided discussions do not converge, understanding does not grow, does not become diversified, and does not find a common conclusion in an open, mutual dialogue that transcends the division. And the problem has been and continues to be that interpretations of decisions differ from one another, frequently contrary to the decisions and their intent. The divided press of the party and of the movement is not the original reason behind this, but has been and is, of course, a factor contributing to its continuation, and discussions and actions have been directed by two separate public images of the party.

The new weekly paper means a common forum. But the nearly unanimous press decision of the Central Committee means more. It contains the aspiration to eliminate this division and to reflect the whole spectrum of opinions in all newspapers within the sphere of SKP influence. The core of the decision is the resolution and proposal to next spring's congress for combining YHTEIS-TYO and TIEDONANTAJA into a newspaper of the SKP Central Committee immediately after the congress.

Such a decision has not been possible before in the most visible and perceptible question of this division in the party, the press question. Why? Because positive development has occurred in the most fundamental prerequisites for unity, in ideological and political questions. This is the predominant trend. And because it is widely understood that it is not possible to continue in the previous manner.

The party's press solution -- and this paper as a part of that solution -- will open the path toward a more open and democratic discussion and party work. Also it will open the path toward a more open interaction with present and future supporters and all Finns. In this way the work of Communists will become enriched and the contribution to building a better Finland and a better world will improve.

People's Democratic Movement

Support for the People's Democrats has been on the decline. The SKP's internal situation, its division, has been cited as one of the important reasons for this. Certainly with good reason.

The press solution will open up realistic prospects, it is a significant step toward a unified SKP. Thus one factor impeding the growth of the People's Democratic movement will be eliminated.

But it is a question of much more. It is clear that the unification and strengthening of the SKP, the SKDL's largest member organization, is of benefit to the whole SKDL. A united SKP will be capable of an equal and more consistent policy of alliance with all of its allies and particularly with its closest allies in the SKDL. In this way better conditions will be created for the People's Democratic movement to broaden its activities and to extend them more extensively to include social factions demanding progressive changes and creating and contributing to the social situation.

Next Spring's Congress

The new paper is replete with hope. For party members this hope is primarily directed at the congress in the spring so that it would strengthen the "new newspaper in the history of the SKP".

The most important question of the congress from the point of view of content will be the reform of the party program. The congress is supposed to confirm the theses for the reform of the party program. It will be a question of evaluating the situation in the world and in Finland and of determining guideposts for the future of Communists. This task will require an extensive and comprehensive discussion that will be theoretical and will be tied to contemporary everyday problems.

The new paper has arrived at a favorable time to open up its columns to this discussion. It will offer the party organizations and members and also outsiders a better opportunity to have their say in the discussion and preparations for the congress. In this way an opportunity will be opened up for the joint making of democratic decisions -- not just documents -- but decisions adopted together, a common property. YHTEISTYÖ [Cooperation] is needed.

10576
CSO: 3617/47

POLITICAL

GREECE

LOCAL CITIZENS' QUESTIONS PUT TO INTERIOR MINISTER

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 7,8 Nov 83 p 5

[Excerpts] Local Self-Government; National Resistance; favoritism; simple proportional vote; the conversion of the townships into municipalities; the pensions of political refugees; the electoral registers; the political parties; popular participation . These were some of the subjects that the readers of ELEVTHEROTYPIA discussed with Minister of Interior Giorgos Gennimatas and Deputy Minister Miltiadis Papaioannou in a question and answer period that lasted 2 hours. The two politicians, who, together with Secretary General Thanassis Tsouras, have undertaken to "remove the Greek people from the corner" and to revitalize its presence in decision-making, realistically answered the questions of their "interrogators," while ELEVTHEROTYPIA taped them.

The meeting took place day before yesterday, Friday, at 9:30 am in the conference room of the Ministry of Interior, next to the minister's office.

Because of the hour, only 15 citizens were present out of the dozens who had addressed questions to the minister by mail via ELEVTHEROTYPIA.

ELEVTHEROTYPIA readers, Messrs. Sotiris Paradeisis and Pan. Pandazopoulos who asked:

"Mr. Minister, prior to the elections, PASOK had vowed before the people to establish the simple proportional vote. Today, the government has stated that it will establish "a system" of simple proportional vote with a bill that it will introduce in the Chamber of Deputies during the spring of 1985. I would like you to explain whether there is a difference between the real, simple proportional vote and the system that the government wants to establish."

Gennimatas: "The electoral law will be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in 1985 when the right time, so to speak, has come. However, if your reader were present, I, in turn, would ask: 'Who judges what is the genuine form of simple proportional vote and what is precisely meant by it?' In any case, these things will be made clear in the Chamber of Deputies by the political representations during the debate on the bill."

Equality on Television

Mr. Grigoris Findanis asked to speak:

"I have," he said, "a series of questions on politics. The first is that, in Greek political life, the grassroots, the people have been squeezed into a position of being a passive receiver. The second: What does the PASOK government do so that the people will not limit themselves to applauding the 'star' cadres and leaders, and the third: Why is television not made equally available to all parties?"

Gennimatas: "Good and momentous questions which are intensely occupying the political leadership of our ministry...after all, we all 'put our shoulder to the wheel' since the first day. That is, how will we revitalize the participation of the people in the decisions that concern them?"

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Is not this the objective of decentralization?

Gennimatas: "Precisely...it is not a matter of a geographical procedure, the parceling out of jurisdiction to the Nomes, the municipalities and the townships, but the return of political and economic power--which to a degree are equivalent--to those who precisely created them, who are none other than the people who create the national product by their daily struggle..."

Findanis: "I can see the political will to do; however, the actions are different."

Gennimatas. "Actually I cannot claim that we were 100 percent successful in the effort to revitalize popular participation. In some places it was successful, in others not. The bases have been lain with the law of the popular conventions, the neighborhood councils, the departmental councils and the simultaneous strengthening of local self-government."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Where, in your experience, Mr. Minister, is popular participation the greatest?

Gennimatas: "In the large urban centers it has not yet been successful. In Athens for instance, this misanthropic city, it is very difficult, almost unachievable, despite the foundations we have lain to succeed in mobilizing the citizen. In the villages, though, the inhabitants talk more and the mayors less. A fact which makes it necessary for us to build new laws through which to approach the problem of participation in a different way in the cities than that in the villages. In a wider sense, the municipal authorities must find the particular ways to mobilize their citizens.

Mr. Konstandinos Angelidis, agreeing with Mr. G. Findanis, stepped in at that moment to oblige the minister to touch upon the subject of the parties:

Angelidis: "Mr. Minister, tell us now about the parties...as soon as you abolished the preferential cross for voting, the deputies of all the parties have disappeared from their constituencies..."

Gennimatas: "I believe the expression 'disappeared' is rather unjust...I will come back to you; to answer Mr. Findanis' question, though, on the 'star' leaders and, at the same time, I will also answer you."

Findanis: "Yes, yes, the authoritarian and 'cadre' based parties..."

Gennimatas: "These are not only related to the democratic process, but also to the devotion of the party cadres to the equalizing of and correlation with the social forces of the country and not because some arbitrarily thought that they are the 'star' minority which, despite the will of the grassroots, impose their views within the party. Perhaps it is there that the reasons for some intra-party clashes in some parties can be found--and even in PASOK itself. It is the mentality of 'I have a better view--I must impose it on the party--the grassroots to the corner!' In brief, the parties must encourage the perceptiveness of the masses and not that of the cadres--I would say--some 'stars'."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Mr. Minister, let us touch upon the cross of preferential voting, if you do not mind?

Gennimatas: "Yes. I believe that the abolishment of preferential vote was a great step towards the creation of 'authority parties.' That is to say, of live organizations whose relation to the people will be a relation of political forces and social forces as, on the other hand, our constitution foresees. The bill that will ensure the economic self-sufficiency of the parties which in essence means political self-sufficiency, aims at the same objective."

Favoritism

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Mr. Minister, is what certain people assert true, that is, that the deputies have 'disappeared' from their districts?

Gennimatas: "I said that the expression 'disappeared' is rather unjust. I would say that it would be better put if we said that the deputies have joined in some collective efforts and processes instead of going around, as in the past, to replace the lack of presence of organized government, in essence doing missionary work. The deputy was forced to do this work because there were no laws of popular participation, as I mentioned before, to which the citizen could turn and participate. These laws give a different dimension to the deputy's role, who is not seeking the cross of preferential vote for the next elections anymore, but struggles and devotes his time, within the national representation, to promote the important political matters of the nation as well as of his own district."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: In brief?

Gennimatas: "In short, it cannot be said that the deputies are absent, but rather that there has been better distribution of their work. Personally, however, I believe that there should be some happy medium. That is to say, that the deputy should be present in his village, his district. This should occur with his participation in the Nome councils despite the fact that the law did not make any provisions for it in the beginning. Today, he also participates in the popular meetings together with the township mayors, the cooperatives, the farmers' associations, the scientists, in the interest of the nation as well as that of his district."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Perhaps the abolishment of the preferential cross vote has engendered some schisms in the relations of the two-way dependence of deputy-voter; therefore, it is said that the deputies 'disappeared?'

Gennimatas: "I would not say the citizen was tied to the deputy through favoritism because, I am sure, this is what you mean by your question..."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Yes...

Gennimatas: "By incorrectly using, in my opinion, this terminology which we ourselves use at times..."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Which one do you mean Mr. Minister?

Gennimatas: "The one that the people do not understand...The citizen was tied to the deputy, not because of favoritism, but because there did not exist the participatory possibilities to solve his problems or those of his village. The deputy, on his part, played the role of mailman. Positively or negatively, this was determined by some coincidences. The same thing with the ministers who were informed occasionally. Today this has changed and the concern which is expressed at the popular meetings reaches the ministerial offices immediately and not by some repercussion."

The first subject today is the moral and material compensation for the fighters in the national resistance. The reply to Messrs. Fotis Trimis, Christos Vourtsakis, Evstratios Karykas and Al. Rakhounis, who each approached the subject from a different point of view.

Vourtsakis: "Mr. Minister, we listened to our hearts and fought. I was caught and confined in a concentration camp...From the reparations paid by the Germans, they gave me 10,000 drachmas. It took 38 years, however for us to get moral satisfaction. What will happen to those whose health was ruined during the fight against the Germans and have not yet been compensated? They are clerks, laborers..."

Gennimatas: "To begin with, a general clarification. It is true that the national resistance fighters, among whom you were one, while fighting in the mountains of our country so that we could be free today, did not do it so that tomorrow they might receive some economic rewards. That is certain. You did it as the performance of a duty. Precisely for this reason, the government, after 40 years (it is too long a time, it is true, but it is not our fault that we came to power so late) has done its duty. Have we finished the job? No! The first matter was the political and moral recognition of national resistance. This has been done."

Trimis: "The question of granting pensions remains. Material satisfaction is moral satisfaction."

Gennimatas: "A special law is needed for the matter of granting pensions. We received this order from the Chamber of Deputies when the National Resistance Law was passed. We have worked, in cooperation with the Finance Ministry, on this bill which is in its final stages. We hope that by the end of 1983, or early 1984, it will be introduced in the Chamber of Deputies for passage."

Reconciliation

Karykas: "In any case, no matter what compensation may be given, I will be forced to look at the face of...(Editor's note: he mentioned the name of some member of the National Defense Battalions, who had persecuted him during those years) and not say anything..."

Gennimatas: "The subject of recognizing the national resistance was mainly an act of political responsibility. We have many differences, party and political, with too many people. We must find the courage not to repeat the things that for years divided the citizens into first and second class, into nationalists and anti-junta and rewrite history from the other side because in this manner we channel water into the ditch of those who have divided the people for so many years. If we begin by saying: "He is no good because during those years he did this or that, then we give them the opportunity to regroup again. Some, who have an interest, are doing it already. They attempt it with proclamations of hatred at a time when we go to Gorgopotamos they go to Vitsi. This is rancor. We should reach out.

The Anti- Junta

Karykas: "Mr. Minister, what will happen to the civil servants, those who are still alive?"

Gennimatas: "A relative presidential decree was published a few days ago according to which public officials, officers, civil servants and employees of agencies will be restored to their positions, actually with a promotion in grade. This has already been completed. It has become law. There is simply the need of the recognition process provided for by the decree.

"Commissions, which will examine each case of the fighters are already being formed in each Nome. They will be composed by service officials and two anti-junta organizations. That is to say, you will express yourselves through the commissions. These commissions will collect all the data, reliable statements, facts, documents, depositions, etc. There are objective documents that will be examined by these commissions."

Vourtsakis: "Mr. Minister, have you taken precautions so that these commissions will not smother us with bureaucracy and take too much time?"

Gennimatas: "You mean that the process of recognition may be time consuming... No, they will not be. The time we allowed is actually long. It is 2 years. This was done in the interest of the anti-junta organizations because, if we provided too short a time during which they could make the recognition, they would not be able to make it in time. In my opinion, it was a mistake of certain newspapers that they spoke about time-consuming process. The process will be very fast."

Television and Parties

Mr. Grigoris Fyndanis emphasized that ideologies do not have percentages and he asked: "Why is television not made available to all Greek parties on a permanent basis so that their views on specific subjects can be developed?"

Gennimatas: "Do you have any idea of how many parties have filed statutes with the Court of First Instance? What I want to say is: Which parties should be chosen and with what criteria? We are in the first stages of Greek television in any case and there is no overnight solution to the subject. One of the first criteria is the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. I do not believe that the percentages are a measure for updating. However, a measure has to be found that enjoys broader consensus."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: In our opinion, there is also an indication of a lack of information on the possibilities available to the citizen for participating in decision-making...

Gennimatas: "In fact, I can say that we are wanting on that subject. However, I, in turn, would ask: 'What does the press do in that direction?' It is the duty of the press, in my humble opinion, to readjust its tactics and to turn to the daily problems of the people and inform them of the possibilities afforded by the laws of popular participation. Here I mean all mass information media, both state and private."

ELEVTHEROTYPIA: Given the specific tendencies of the press, however, you, as the government, what are you doing to inform the people?

Gennimatas: "The programs for giving impetus to the laws of popular participation are being prepared. Radio and television have broadcast some popular meetings and conferences of some councils. The radio, mainly, and especially in the morning hours, I believe, has espoused these laws."

Self-Government

One's appetite having been whetted, a new questioning barrage was loosed upon the minister by two of our readers (Messrs. D. Daremas and K. Angelidis), who, because of their qualifications, know the subject of self-government well.

"Mr. Minister," they asked, "when the law on the prefects was passed in 1982, you stated that the second step of Local Self-Government would be enacted in 2 years. Is this promise of yours going to be implemented and when is the bill going to be passed by the Chamber of Deputies?"

Gennimatas: "I did not say that it would be implemented: I said that it would be enacted and put into effect later. In fact, today, exactly 2 years after having taken over the administration and less than 2 years, of course, since Law 1235 for the prefects was passed, we have already formed the Local Self-Government Code Commission of the new democratic statute chart and we will introduce it today or tomorrow. It will be composed of all parties and all social levels and it will prepare not only the second and third steps of local self-government, but a wholly new code that will put everything in order. Of course, we have set forth our views on the second and third steps of self-government in the introductory remarks of the 5-year Plan. As soon as they have been passed, I hope that the bill will be passed immediately thereafter."

"At the same time, we will introduce in the Chamber of Deputies another law of a transitory nature which will be yet another step in the direction of the second

for self-government. We are building a province, that is, with provincial councils, especially in the islands, so that they may acquire greater possibilities and prospects.

Voter Registration Rolls

In continuation, Messrs. Evst, Karykas and Kon, Kondazis, touching upon the subject of voter registration rolls and census, observed:

"Mr. Minister, the way the voter registration rolls are, where there are still deceased persons listed, is there a possibility of a recurrence of what happened in 1961 where even the trees voted?"

"While Ilioupolis has 120,000 inhabitants only 25,000 of them are registered to vote and, thus, our municipality obtains less money from your ministry."

The minister thought that the last question should be answered first and asked the deputy minister to do it.

Papaioannou: "The regular subsidy is not granted to the municipality on the basis of registered voters but according to the census that takes place every 10 years. As a matter of fact, those present in a specific municipality on that day are counted, whether they are residents or not."

The minister answered the first question and said:

Gennimatas: "In the forthcoming Europarliamentary elections and the 1985 elections, the voter registration rolls will not contain the names of those who have passed away. This cleanup is being done by computer and is complete, except, of course, for recent deaths. In any case, everyone has the right to transfer his voter registration to Ilioupolis or anywhere he wishes, although I do not recommend it. With regard to the...trees, I believe you should not worry."

9731
CSO: 3521/97

ND YOUTH ORGANIZATION'S LEADERS, - CADRES

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 13 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] Last week was a "hot" week for Mr. Averoff's New Democracy: a quarrel-filled meeting of the party's parliamentary group (where it took considerable effort to maintain "order"), an address by former minister, Mr. Manos, that led him to the disciplinary council and an expulsion of politician Mr. Mbernitsas, because of a protest on the activities of junta persons in the ND, which have brought about confusion in the leadership of today's official opposition.

In the span of a few days, the ND was confronted in short order by the problem of "gerontocracy," by the search for a credible ideological identity and by the critical matter of the activities of extreme rightwing elements in the lineup of "radical liberalism."

Today, we will address ourselves to the latter problem in view of the fact that the data on efforts to turn part of the ND into a fascist faction are very serious. In last Wednesday's meeting the KO [Parliamentary Group], "reform" deputy, Mr. Dion. Livanos missed the bull's-eye--apparently because of the lack of proper information on the details--when he presented data on the extreme Right activities in the student sector of the College, which is on friendly terms with the ND. However, he touched on a real fact. A little later, at the same meeting, the same subject was broached with finesse by "dauphin," Mr. Mboutos, considering the disturbing attacks of extreme Right elements in the youth organization of the New Democracy as having been proven.

What is Happening in the ONNED

What exactly is taking place in the ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy], which is in the throes of a serious crisis of its own, along and within the one that is plaguing Mr. Averoff's party?

Let's take things in order:

The ONNED leadership is today the only stable support lever of Mr. E. Averoff at the summit of the New Democracy, while anything can happen, at any given time, within the ranks of the KO.

With the extreme rightwing axis Mikhaloliakos-Manolakos,--leader and deputy leader respectively--with Mr. And. Samaras, a young deputy from Messinia as the

political "representative" of Mr. Averoff and a few tens of thousands of "hooligan," extreme rightwing youths as action organs, the ONNED is marching on the road towards fascism, by terrorizing or persecuting the moderate elements that dare at times to express their opposition to this dangerous course.

The 25 October Conference

The "hardliners" of the extreme rightwing ONNED leadership, are: Mikhaloliakos, Manolakos, Stathopoulos, Angelidis and Khatzinikolaou (son of the ND deputy). "Staff office" is the home of the Youth's leader, V. Mikhaloliakos. There, on 25 October (shortly after the ND meeting at Salonica), there was developed, with the participation of And. Samaras, the strategy "line" for the forthcoming months:

To eliminate "any kind of reformist and any other strange cadres." The support of Mr. Averoff. Attack "Karamanlis," in view of the fact that the founder of the ND is today the most repulsive name within the genuine Right...

At the same meeting (where another Youth "star," Th. Mavromatis, former member of the ONNED's executive committee, was among the 11 present), leader Mikhaloliakos made the statement to his colleagues that:

He has been authorized by Mr. Averoff to tell them that there are available, to those ONNED cadres who show special zeal in their work, five eligible places on the party ticket and 30 prefect positions when the party wins the elections.

V. Mikhaloliakos himself, has, as his friends say, the verbal promise for a candidate's spot on the party ticket for the First or Second Athens District. (The extreme rightwing leader of ONNED is so trusted by Mr. Averoff that--if one is to believe his claims--in November 1981 he took care of leasing office space for the party that the present ND leader was going to form had he lost the leadership struggle to Mr. Rallis.

Extreme Rightwing Terrorism

The leadership of ONNED cooperates closely and on a permanent basis, with the extreme rightwing youth organization ENEK [United Nationalist Movement] since last year's "celebration" at Makrygiannis. It is worthy of note that ENEK's newspaper ETHNIKOS SYNAGERMOS, faithful to its "principles," always attacks the ND, but has warm expressions for ONNED's leadership. The infiltration of ONNED by extreme rightwing cadres is extensive and organized by the Mikhaloliakos-Manolakos duo (the flirtation has advanced as far as groups of the "Blue Angels" type--which in Piraeus supported Skylitsis during the last municipal elections--with such royalist-junta people as the secretary of ONNED of Nea Ionia, a Manolakos protege, Pelekanos and other extreme Right factions in and out of Athens.

Within the ONNED there is open threatening whenever "dissenters" of any hue appear. Some examples:

ONNED's Kifisia secretary, Mr. Pevkianakis, was expelled because he protested that every time he asked for a speaker for some demonstration the leadership would send And. Samaras.

Three members from Salonica were expelled because leader Mikhaloliakos "caught" them cooperating with "reformist" KPEE [Center for Political Research and Training] in organizing training seminars.

The local ONNED groups were warned not to invite as speakers party cadres who are not proven friends of Youth.

In the local offices there is always a trusted Mikhaloliakos-Manolakos man, who "records" situations and initiates the persecution of the "troublemakers."

The "Light Brigade"

However, the trouble does not stop there:

The ONNED leadership has formed a "dynamic group" of 165 persons headed by Manolakos whose friends call him the "general..."

Several "mobilization plans have been worked out--if our reports are not correct, those involved can deny them with our thanks--such as: In 45 minutes, the "Brigade" can be in a position to surround a conference room of the KO to create the proper climate...

The "elite" of the leadership perform other "jobs" such as dire threats directed against "reformists"--such "signals" have already been received by Dr. Andrianopoulos, Dion. Livanos and other deputies and politicians.

Reactions

The attempt to convert the ONNED into a fascist organization is not proceeding without reaction.

There are about 250 medium and lower echelon ONNED cadres who today express their indignation about this matter and are seriously concerned as much for ONNED's future as for their own presence within the organization. The "dissenters," who represent a considerable section of the Youth, refuse even the "Blue Generation" title, which, in their view, deprives ONNED of any substantial political character and allows Mikhaloliakos-Manolakos to become involved, in the name of the "blue" in a myriad unacceptable activities.

Lately, the "Mitsotakis" group has been trying to "absorb" the reactions of ONNED moderates. Mr. Mikh. Papakonstandinou is maintaining the necessary contacts with a nucleus of dissenters and, more specifically, with Mr. Th. Panagos, an old member of ONNED's executive committee.

Deputy D. Livanos was headed in the right direction, then, last Wednesday in the KO of the party, when he referred to the activities of extreme rightwing "Free Students" of New Democracy origin at Athens College, who dream in their pamphlets of a "strong, dynamic, decisive and effective Right with victory as its aim!" The Averoff followers--who ran scared for a moment--in the end found themselves covered pro-forma when it was ascertained that the perpetrators had been expelled from MAKI [Student Independent Movement] (which is headed by the son of Khatzinkolaou, a protege of "general" Manolakos). Had Mr. Livanos been better

prepared, he would have done great damage to the ND's leadership group which was caught by surprise because it did not expect attacks from "reformists" at Wednesday's meeting (it is said that Averoff's "informer" in the "Group of 29" of the reform was badly misinformed...).

However, the problem still exists. And it is substantial. If the pro-junta members of the ND, denounced by former deputy Mbernitsas, are now moving with relative ease in Mr. Averoff's party, the extreme rightwingers move with total ease within the Youth of Mikhaloliakos-Manolakos who dream, with the blessings of ND's leadership, of the glorious days of EKOF [National Social Organization of Students] in the '60's.

9731
CSO: 3521/97

VVD'S NIJPELS ON RELATIONS WITH CDA, PVDA

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 7 Dec 83 p 7

[Interview with Ed Nijpels, leader of the VVD, in his office by Rien Robijns and Henk Brons: "No Sane Person Can Cheer About this Policy"; date not given; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] The Christian democrats are becoming very nervous about it: the blue braggarts of the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] are scoffing at just about everything that used to make their life so bearable. They speak openly of "badgering" and accuse VVD leader Ed Nijpels of "lack of breeding." Moreover, they are very clearly leaning to the right. Led by Prime Minister Lubbers, a CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] caravan is now marching through the country to call an end to the "damage."

Is Nijpels driving the Lubbers administration toward a crisis because of the way he is acting? Are his party colleagues-members of the government still able to follow him? And does he sometimes still think of a coalition with the PvdA [Labor Party], which he was so actively working for in earlier days?

HET VRIJE VOLK reporters Rien Robijns and Henk Brons talked about this with the man who used to refer to CDA members as "untrustworthy people."

Both of Ed Nijpels' hands still have five fingers, even though for the last year and a half he has had to use them to shake the hands of CDA members virtually every day. "The risk factor" (Lubbers), "who is leading himself and the administration toward a crisis" (Van Agt) by "releasing balloons which burst with a loud pop" (other Christian democrats) folded his hands over his knee in a relaxed manner when we talked to him about, among other things, his inflammable relationship with his coalition partner. He laughed broadly when we started quoting statements he made a few years ago about "CDA members who use tricks, who are socio-economically slippery and further highly unreliable." "Yes," the liberal leader noted cheerfully, "I have built up a certain fame with this, with those kinds of statements. At the time we did have quite a number of objections too, but now," he put himself in a more comfortable position, "now things are going quite a bit better." And you really mean that? 'Yes, certainly; however, they often have to get used to it when they hear what is at stake.'

When we talked to him, he had just had his weekly morning meeting with Lubbers, Van Aardenne and De Vries ("go through the problems") at the Catshuis, and then he had lunch at the English embassy. Right before being allowed in, we saw some of his political associates quickly slip in to give him useful suggestions about how to keep our country governable. However, later on Nijpels gave the impression that he did have the matter in hand. At least in the short term, he disclosed to us with a grin, "it is harder to look at the long term; the big helmsman from Leeuwarden always said that too (Wiegel - editor)." When he noticed our somewhat uneasy reaction, he immediately added: "Which does not mean that we don't always continue to think about the long term, certainly not."

Above his head in his luxurious office, numerous framed cartoons about him are displayed. In most cases, the cartoonists did not portray him in a very flattering way, which reminds us of such terms as "impudent gas-bag" who "keeps running off the mouth," which his coalition partners sometimes use to depict him when they are unhappy. But the comic strip lover Nijpels looks at them tenderly. "A hobby; when I see one in the newspaper, I immediately call up the cartoonist to ask whether I could have the original," said the 'Spirou of the Low Countries.'

Gnashing Teeth

But /let us get/ down to business. The relationship with the CDA. In the lobbies, Nijpels sometimes does like to thump his chest saying that he is the one at least who, after so many years, tells the Christian democrats the truth once in a while. As a matter of fact, the PvdA has never yet dared to do this. And it is true: a short survey quickly shows that the CDA is following his conduct with gnashing teeth. Which in turn particularly pleases the renewed VVD parliamentary party. "Now, when they pull a rotten trick they get an immediate and effective reaction. They hate us like the plague." And: "In the past, we just made little noises. You were glad if you had talked to a CDA member. If you lost, you defended the compromises. Ed plays it bare knuckle. The whole parliamentary party supports that," said VVD member of parliament Keja. It is not without reason that a CDA caravan, led by Prime Minister Lubbers himself, is marching through the streets of the land to try to polish their damaged image. "We have made life a burden for the CDA," the vice president of the PvdA parliamentary party, Wim Meijer, told VRIJ NEDERLAND recently, "but now they get hit over the head daily by the VVD." Nijpels laughed warmly when he heard these statements.

"From the beginning," he said, "the relationship between the CDA and the VVD has been reasonably businesslike. But it is true that they have to get used to the renewed VVD. More than half of the parliamentary party members are new, another generation of politicians, no longer people who are happy simply to be allowed to sit at the government table."

'Guys like De Grave and Linschoten have a very different outlook on conducting politics and on coalition relationships. They behave differently. But on the other hand: the CDA is also sailing in a different direction, which makes it more pleasant for us to work with them than it used to be.'

Question: That does not prevent you from conducting a "karate policy" toward the CDA, as Keja called it.

Nijpels: That is an exaggerated figure of speech. I like vivid expressions, but that is a bit much. No, the relationship is really better. That business of the past, when Lubbers was still parliamentary party president, of constantly haggling about all kinds of government plans, has happened much less frequently recently. Take the General Considerations, the short debates about the 3 percent discount, De Vries did not yield at all in them. What happened in the past was that they stuck to their guns during the general considerations, but during the following debates they did give in. Now compromises are concluded and flatly defended. They don't always try to get out from under it. Look at the defense memorandum. No, in the past... Sometimes, as president of the parliamentary party, Rietkerk returned to the parliamentary party in despair after having had a discussion with the coalition partner.

Doormat

Question: Was Rietkerk a kind of doormat on which the CDA wiped its feet? You wanted to keep that from happening?

Nijpels: Now, now, a doormat... But there is no doubt that cooperation within the first Van Agt administration was not always a lark. Now you can make agreements. For the first time in its existence, the CDA stands squarely behind the government policy being conducted.

Question: And yet, during that famous trip of the three big parties to Washington, De Vries burst out of his made-to-measure suit several times because you rankled him.

Nijpels: Hm, do you think De Vries wears a made-to-measure suit? But leaving that aside: something like that does not mean that we cannot get along pretty well. Only, I would also worry if I were faced with a parliamentary party like his. If, before a vote, you don't know precisely how many parliamentary party colleagues will support a motion which you yourself have introduced...

I can imagine that that would give you gray hair. But for us that is a reason to ensure that he does not get any extra gray hair. Unless it is a question of political points which are worth it, of course.

Question: In any case, it now seems that Lubbers is being driven into a corner in matters where, as parliamentary party president, during the first Van Agt administration, he always haggled.

Nijpels: Lubbers picked up experience as parliamentary party president. That is a very good thing before you become prime minister. On the other hand, Lubbers has taken a look on the other side of the line. This is why he wants to be sure beforehand of the support of the parliamentary parties in the government. His experience as parliamentary party president has enriched his actions as prime minister. He knows what can happen in parliament if you don't make agreements. He does not want to experience as prime minister what he caused in the past as parliamentary party president. That is to say, that

parliament would constantly ride over his plans. Hence, no pure dualism, organize support to a reasonable extent.

Question: But then you get 4 men on duty at the Catshuis on Wednesday mornings, slavishly followed by a little less than 80 others? That is the image: parliament more or less left out of it.

Nijpels: No, you know. The issues are indeed discussed beforehand, but they naturally do come before parliament. It is true that a great deal of discussion takes place between the parliamentary party presidents and the ministers, but is it wrong for some preliminary discussions to take place? That is precisely what the PvdA always does when it is in the government. It goes like this: we commit ourselves to the amounts and to the area in which a solution must be found. It is still possible to shift within that framework, but not to shoot holes in it. We experienced that trauma during the previous coalition. We don't want that anymore.

Sun on their Backs

Question: We can see it before our eyes: four men in the Catshuis, a cup of coffee, sun on their backs, a mood of being among friends, a pleasant game of poker with power. In the secure knowledge that the parliamentary parties -- because they are also aware of the election polls -- will bend. In such an atmosphere, certain decisions could quickly seem less of a disaster than they really are, couldn't they?

Nijpels: That is really not the way it is. Things are really not just decided over a cup of coffee. Measures are worked over endlessly. You hold discussions with your parliamentary party experts, you swing back and forth between the Catshuis and the parliamentary party. Or between De Vries and your parliamentary party. If you already agree on something, you will have to face parliament with it. Nothing occurs overnight.

Question: That sounds nice, but what is really being endlessly worked over when parliamentary party colleague De Korte is always ready in the background with his pocket calculator to say that something is financially not possible? Even your oldest parliamentary party member Joekes felt that this was wrong.

Nijpels: Joekes has been in parliament for about 20 years now. He must indeed also get used to those things. It is true that the government fractions are being intimately involved in the policy. The administration goes to the parliamentary parties and wants certainties. That is true in 80 percent of the cases. In the past, when Joekes started, a minister would go to the parliamentary party once a year, but that time is past. If no discussions have taken place, then we are free with regard to that policy. And this government does not want to take that risk.

Wastepaper Basket

Question: Now it is: the government agreement has been concluded, no more trouble, govern. Good alternatives? Don't talk, go on.

Nijpels: In the past, the government agreement was written and then stored in the nearest drawer, if it didn't simply end up in the wastepaper basket. Then it no longer existed. Now, the agreement is simply implemented. Finally it works that way. We have been asking for years for the policy being implemented now. Following the drawing up of the government agreement, we all scratched behind our ears while exclaiming: how could we drag out such a government agreement? And what do we see now: it is even being implemented. No, as far as policy is concerned, we have no reason to complain. I don't mean to say that the government agreement is the ultimate wisdom, but so far I have not seen any alternative which tackles the problems better.

Question: Many VVD members feel bitter toward you in particular, because you don't even extend the honor of any recognition to them. If they want to introduce a motion, you are ready with your fountain pen to co-sign it, so that the recognition is immediately lost. CDA member of parliament Dien Cornelisse called that: "The VVD co-signs something, and then they say once again: the CDA is creeping toward the VVD."

Nijpels: You can find all kinds of things behind that. They have also called it a deadly hug. The CDA must keep in mind that there is no need at all to be ashamed of agreeing with the VVD. We have very respectable points of view. Propagated by Hans Wiegel since 1972. And they are now being put into practice. That requires a psychological process of adjustment on the part of the CDA; that is to be expected. But what objection can there be to my stressing our unity that way?

Question: And yet, a few months ago Lubbers called you "a risk factor" and Van Agt even saw you drawing the administration into a crisis.

Nijpels: (shrugging his shoulders) As far as that last comment is concerned, that is certainly exaggerated. People who are somewhat closer to the matter have a better understanding of how the relationships are.

Question: The other day, Lubbers said in DE TELEGRAAF that he is beginning to understand you a little better.

Nijpels: (coolly) It's about time then.

Question: Apparently Lubbers is no friend of yours?

Nijpels: I am not in politics in order to make friends, but in order to achieve as many things as possible which the VVD would like to see achieved. And if I make friends in the process, then that is a nice gain. It is not at all my character to make enemies.

Surprise Policy

Question: As far as relations with the administration are concerned: according to what we heard, Vice Prime Minister Van Aardenne also feels that you conduct a surprise policy. Aren't there always good feelings between the youthful blue blazers with new coalition customs and the old three piece suits, who know how to act among gentlemen?

Nijpels: There is absolutely no question of that. Surprise policy? Everything I say that causes commotion, I discuss beforehand with Van Aardenne. My relationship with him is actually very good. We are attuned to each other in everything. For a year and a half already.

Question: According to reports, when you launched your salvation plans for AOW [General Old Age Insurance Act] beneficiaries early this year at a VVD congress -- plans with which you disappeared into the fog later on -- Van Aardenne and his people did not know anything about it. They had even made totally different agreements within the administration.

Nijpels: Oh no, it was much stronger even. We discussed those AOW proposals with the whole party leadership. And Van Aardenne was part of that. The only question was who would announce them. And I was given that task. It was a very deliberate choice. It is not as if on the way to a speaking engagement I would suddenly have a brainwave and would immediately start shouting something. All serious political issues are talked through, certainly with Van Aardenne. It never happens in such a way that Van Aardenne turns on the radio or television and then comes to the conclusion: hey, now what? It does of course happen that Lubbers is surprised. Van Aardenne does not discuss everything I have talked through with him with the prime minister. The opposite is undoubtedly also true. But with really serious issues, I also inform the coalition partner.

Question: But it is said that 2 weeks ago, when the civil servants actions were still in progress, you personally prevented the government -- with the support of Van Aardenne and Rietkerk -- from making a new opening toward the civil servants. You are supposed to have done this by standing squarely behind Ruding in the name of the parliamentary party.

Nijpels: Absolute hogwash. Of course, we supported Ruding. Just as we did the previous times. But Van Aardenne and I were in complete agreement on the fact that Ruding should be supported. It didn't take us half a minute to conclude that this time Ruding was right again.

With the PvdA

Question: Once you were a member of the so-called Des Indes group, where members of the PvdA and of the VVD met to talk about possible cooperation. When you began as parliamentary party leader, you were seen as a member of the D'66 [Democrats '66] within the VVD, who might well be able to create that opening. That seems very far in the past.

Nijpels: Why? In spite of all the noise being made about it, the differences are much smaller than everyone thinks. In its own plan, the PvdA is already coughing up about 6 billion guilders in savings. That was absolutely unthinkable, even impossible, during the second Van Agt administration. There are a couple major questions left for the coming years. The review of social security. How are we going to determine the civil servant policy? But a large number of bumps have already been taken in the socio-economic area. And yes, the question of security, the missiles, that remains a very large bottleneck. Cooperation... I really believe that this depends to a large extent on the

question of who will support him and whether the ministerial group will be able to determine factor for factor what the future cooperation is between the CDA and the VVD will be possible.

Question: You consider that the PvdA has been too far from reality. How?

Nijpels: Impossible, you know, because I mean, everybody, the government he represents cannot handle difficult issues. And when Mr Lubbers had time to know him better during the trips to Washington and Moscow, not least over that psychological barrier being overcome. Perhaps his position will have gotten ahead of him. It also depends on what the program says or perhaps the administration finishes its ride. But then the PvdA will also have to answer the following question: if you choose a coalition partner, is there still that much difference between the CDA and the VVD, which was always thought? If the administration continues as it is, then the differences between the CDA and the VVD are not so many people would like to believe.

Question: With whom is the PvdA in agreement?

Nijpels: Oh, with a whole bunch of them... Relus ter Beek, whom I got to know as chairman of the delegation to Washington and Moscow. I feel that that man did an excellent job and that he had very reasonable views. Then one like Kombrink, I think that man could work very well with him. I think that basically, Marcel van der Velde is a man whom I work very well with.

The man's image probably won't be good, but it is too rough for most people. But I do like people who want to prove specifically that they think about something. However, my opinion is that we must achieve the VVD in the program with. And I note that things are excellent now with the CDA, even though people feel that sometimes I take too clear a position. But to take clear positions, there is no difficulty, unless it conflicts with other positions.

Colijn

Question: And so you expect the party to be in the situation of the administration, awaiting better times?

Nijpels: Oh, that comparison is not right. It is not similar to the comparison to predecessors of Mr Lubbers. But in reality, the situations are considerably incomparable. We now have a better situation of prosperity. The government has been expanded enormously. It is not clear that all the difficulties of the past are still being handled in the same way.

Question: At that time the policies were, among others, what you think the lessons should be drawn from that?

Nijpels: Aside from the obvious: it must be clear that cuts need to be made, that something must be reduced, etcetera. And they think that this must also be salutary for the economy. Only the socialists feels that the government finances must be retrenched. In that respect, it is already impossible

to compare the situation with Colijn. Now everyone feels that cuts are necessary.

Question: But not so harsh?

Nijpels: The question is of whether it can be done that harshly. Besides, I have always said that the government agreement is not holy to me. Anyone who can show me, hard figures in hand, that there are better solutions may always call me out of bed.

Question: The CPB [Central Planning Bureau] figures on the PvdA plan, the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] plan?

Nijpels: I don't get out of bed for those; they prove that the national debt is growing.

Question: Apparently, aside from that financing deficit, everything else seems to leave you cold.

Nijpels: What nonsense; of course not. Eight hundred thousand people have to make do with unemployment benefits, half of them young people. That doesn't leave one cold. Or civil servants who have made commitments and now are running into problems... No sensible person can cheer about this policy. But I do think that it is necessary. Only, I don't raise the flag for the measures which are being taken. But I have yet to hear the recipe which will make me say: the government agreement should be thrown into the wastepaper basket; we will continue with another policy.

8463

CSO: 3614/20

CRISIS IN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPEAL PARTY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 15 Dec 83 p 2

Article: "Crisis of the Dutch Christian Democrats"

Text With the resignation of members of parliament Scholten and Dijkman from the parliamentary group of the Dutch Christian Democrats, a long-smoldering fight has come to an end. For the majority of the Christian Democratic party and its members of parliament, both dissidents have more and more become know-it-alls who have hardened into an extreme position. However, the attention given to the agonizingly slow to accomplish cutting of the umbilical cord, as well as the general situation of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) indicates that reducing it to a personal problem would be a narrow way of looking at it.

Differences on Central Points

Indeed, both of those who resigned became fringe figures also because they consciously turned against the parliamentary group not only in individual questions, but also in problems pertaining to the heart of government policy, such as national defense and fiscal policy. About which it should be noted that in the Dutch Parliament, where there is no official party discipline, divergent voting behavior has only very recently been viewed as heresy. The support that they granted to opposition proposals, however, eventually also brought to Scholten and Dijkman the opposition of those Christian Democratic members of parliament who agreed with them in many political questions.

This political dissent, which has at best been whitewashed after the departure of the two black sheep, represents the true problem of the CDA. The differences of opinion within the coalesced party, which was formed in 1980 from three denominational parties, cannot be attributed to the disloyal actions of some troublemakers. A structural weakness in the Christian party lies in the fact that serious differences of opinion exist between Catholics and Protestants concerning basic social questions. In addition, the CDA is not only having difficulty formulating, in an unambiguous, yet universally acceptable way, what politics with a Christian face means today. It must reconcile its ideological background, which furthers the tendency towards becoming a party based on conviction, with its politically realistic

requirements, which a popular centrist party, as the CNA wants to be, sees itself at the mercy of.

Scholten and Dijkman are basically accepted spokesmen of one possible development; specifically, one towards a program that derives from Christian pacifist and social service answers to today's political questions of defense and economy. With regard to the limited subject of nuclear arms, this approach would perhaps be shared by a majority in the party, in view of the overwhelmingly strong rejection of the deployment of missiles by the Dutch people. In general, however, it is not a basis for consensus, certainly not in the coalition with the liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). However, the CDA must take into account this factor, which originated outside their own group. On no account do they want to let the coalition split, certainly not on their own initiative.

Stumbling Block Social Expenditures

The Christian Democrats would have to count on a loss of as many as 10 of their 45 seats if new elections were held. On the other hand, the party leadership is going to great pains to try to indeed follow a de facto liberal policy, but at the same time clearly not to let the Christian Democrats trot along behind the junior liberal partners. Scarcely more than forced attempts to distance themselves in the areas of social policy are emerging. This is not possible either, the CDA says in unison with the liberal VVD; the Dutch social system can no longer be financed during this crisis. If the necessity of budget cuts can be shown using budget arithmetic, then the party is falling short in its attempt to make this policy's target of Christian solidarity credible.

One has the impression that these problems of legitimacy, which are leading to rumblings in the party and in the parliamentary group, are being treated at the higher political levels primarily with appeals to an esprit de corps. As far as the immediate cohesion of the parliamentary group goes, the exclusion of Scholten and Dijkman succeeded as a psychological device. Voting behavior in the case of the controversial civil service pay cuts, which can be seen as a test, allows no other conclusion. It is questionable, however, whether this unity, which at the same time denotes an encapsulation of currents among voters as well as within the party, will stand up in a crucial test such as the missile debate, which will not be held in the Dutch Parliament until next spring.

12271
CSO: 3620/119

LAWYERS' LETTER CRITICAL OF INTERIOR MINISTER'S CONDUCT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Dec 83 p 16

[Text] On the first anniversary of the Socialist government, a group of lawyers analyzes critically the policies of the minister of interior, Jose Barrionuevo. For the authors of the article, the minister's actions represent a return to the old ways in the sphere of civil liberties and they consider that his conduct of affairs must be analyzed alongside with the government's general policy of 'subordination of the citizens' to the state.

The first Socialist government celebrated its first year in power a few days ago. To mark the occasion the mass media has tried to take stock of the new government's performance on an overall basis or by sectors. We, the lawyers who undersigned this document, consider it our civic duty to equally take stock of the situation in the specific sphere of individual rights and civil liberties.

We who are lawyers committed to the protection of the individual and collective rights of the citizens wish to express our deep concern over the retrogressive role played by Interior Minister Barrionuevo over this entire past year with his actions in the sphere of public order.

Allow us to recall some significant highlights of Mr Barrionuevo's performance as minister.

--He has covered up and justified the irregular and even criminal actions of the forces of public order: Martin Luna's death in Barcelona; roadblocks which resulted in the death of a child (Valmojano) and in people being injured; police aggression during the carnival celebrations in Malasana or during recent demonstrations in Bilbao and other towns; illegal and clandestine police operations in the French Basque country; over 100 cases of torture and rough treatment denounced but never cleared because the ministry did not want to pursue the matter.

--He has constantly defended and indiscriminately sided with the state's security forces which were never purged in connection with the notorious role they played under the Franco regime; he has kept and promoted to positions of responsibility men known to be opposed to democracy (Police Superintendents Matute, Navales and Ballesteros among others).

--He has applied the antiterrorist legislation widely and indiscriminately with the resulting violation of fundamental human rights both in specific operations of a repressive nature and in "preventive" or intimidating operations against the entire population of towns, house-to-house searches in Hondarribia and in many localities of Euzkadi, in the Madrid district of El Pilar, in the development of the ZEN [Special Northern Zone] Project, among others.

--He was the driving force behind the draft bill on "repentant terrorists" and promoted the idea of "citizens' cooperation" by means of repression advocating the belief that to be an informer and to have a mercenary spirit are genuine social qualities.

--It is obvious that the Ministry of Interior was behind the restrictions assed to the draft bill on aid to detainees which deprived that bill of all its progressive content. It firmly supported the Antiterrorist Law in spite of the fact that it is unconstitutional--something which even the government has admitted--in the issue of allowing detainees to have legal counsel. It was opposed and also tried to restrict the legislative initiatives taken by the Ministry of Justice to regulate the habeas corpus right and the right of asylum.

--There has been a gradual establishment of a police state which must know and control everything: telephone tapping continues; the order of 25 April 1983 calls for police control in all real estate transactions even though the proposed sanctions have not been applied in view of the wave of protest that order has provoked; there are plans to introduce a new ID card and a program for the control and centralization of computerized date is underway.

Dangerous Precedents

It is easy to see that many of these measures amount to a return to the policy of public order of the Franco regime. Looking at the most recent measure, the order of 25 April 1983 on rental and sale of apartments and commercial premises, one observes that its legal base is article 8 of the Royal Decree-Law of 26 January 1979 on Protection of the Citizens' Security stipulating that the security services must be given all the personal data on the contracting parties. At the time, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] voted against ratification of that royal decree-law and even the UDC [Democratic Center Union] government did not dare to pass the additional regulations on rental control. The specific legislation stipulation the sanctions against those who fail to observe the order of 25 April 1983 is contained in the Law of Public Order of 30 July 1959 which is still in force and governs the authority of the government to impose sanctions. That same law was used by the dictatorship to imprison without trial those who fought against Franco. We are well aware of the fact that the steps taken by Minister Barrionuevo go hand-in-hand with a specific government policy described as a policy to ensure "the citizens' security," a policy which has the backing of the entire Socialist government and the underlying purpose of which is to produce a new social consensus based on the weekly-accepted subordination of the citizen to the state.

We want to make it clear that we cannot agree with the concept of citizens' security as reflected in the revealing actions of Mr Barrionuevo.

For us, lawyers committed to the difficult task of protecting people's liberties, it is especially intolerable to see that democratic rights and liberties are being constantly undermined for the sake of repressing moves explained as being the only possible answer to the social, economic and national conflicts facing the Spanish state.

Because we consider that the minister of interior is acting in a way which reflects the state policy, for which he is not responsible, but that he carried that policy to its most extreme form, we are taking the initiative of proposing that public opinion start a widespread popular campaign to ask the government to dismiss Barrionuevo and to bring about genuine changes in the policies of the Ministry of Interior forcing it to respect the fundamental rights and liberties of the people.

This article is signed by Maria Teresa Aguado Hernandez and by 158 other lawyers.

8796
CSO: 3548/136

POLITICAL

SPAIN

EXTREMADURA LEADER PROPOSES REGIONAL POLICIES

Madrid YA in Spanish 13 Dec 83 p 8

[Article: "At the 21st Century Club: The President of the Extremadura Council Asks for the Dissolution of the Nuclear Security Council"]

[Text] He claims that there is negligence in its administration and that "it is not informed as to what is happening at the nuclear power plants."

In a statement he made from the podium of the 21st Century Club, Juan Carlos Rodriguez Ibarra, the president of the Extremadura Council, yesterday called for the dissolution of the Nuclear Security Council (CSN) because of its negligence and irresponsibility with respect to the region of Extremadura.

In his talk on the topic of "Extremadura, a Nonhistorical Autonomous Community," part of the series, "Vertebrate Spain," the president of the Extremadura Council noted that "the insensitivity of the class of politicians is at times monumental." "When we take a close look at the actions of the board of directors of the RTVE [Directorate General of Radio and Broadcasting and Television]," he said, "we note that no one has yet raised his voice in favor of creating a permanent parliamentary committee to keep tabs on the CSN, whose errors or acts of negligence can affect the fortunes and lives of hundreds of thousands of Spaniards. And you can take my word for it, negligence does exist. This agency is apparently not informed as to what is happening at the nuclear power plants, at least those that are in Extremadura."

Interregional Solidarity

The president of the council sharply criticized the CSN with regard to the construction of the Valdecaballeros nuclear plant in Badajoz Province, "a plant that is not considered to be necessary by the rest of the region, the autonomous community that perhaps exports more energy to the rest of the Spanish regions and which already has two nuclear power plants in operation."

During his talk on Extremadura Juan Carlos Rodriguez Ibarra also challenged the rest of the autonomous governments, fundamentally the historic ones, to show that Article 2 of the Constitution, with reference to interregional solidarity, is good for something and has not in practice been annulled.

Rodriguez Ibarra made a brief comparative analysis of the autonomous process in our country, reviewing the history of Extremadura and concluding that Extremadura has experienced enough autonomous developments in its past for it not to regard its present autonomy as a development foreign to it, although this autonomy has been granted. The president stressed the fact that Extremadura exports raw materials, cheap labor, electrical and nuclear energy, etc. to all Spaniards, yet receives almost nothing in exchange. He also rejected a policy of wailing for Extremadura, which must advance into the future making use of the autonomous process as a vehicle for its development and because it represents the first genuine opportunity for self-government in this region. This policy must be conceived from the standpoint of unity and solidarity with other regions and in terms of the requirement of some of the same levels of relation with the central administration as well as of distribution of the transferred powers and of the nation's wealth.

The president also emphasized the need for the national news media's changing their attitude toward Extremadura, appealing to their social function and sense of responsibility to avoid morbid manipulations and relegating the region to the sidelines while ignoring its genuine, real current importance. He rejected the fact that people continue to assign "roles" to Extremadura that are no longer appropriate to it today.

Extremadura, Europe's Breadbasket

As for Extremadura's socioeconomic situation, the president discussed the need for a new economic model for the region, starting with a definitive study of the highest levels of its economic structure — a subject the council is at present working on — as the basis for a planning of resources and the creation of enough facilities to permit the development of Extremadura's principal sectors, especially the food-growing sector, whereby Extremadura will be able to turn itself into the breadbasket of Europe after we join the EEC. In his opinion, some of the factors governing the recovery of the Extremadura economy could lie in the investment of capital from other communities, in the utilization and exploitation of idle resources and in the technological and commercial updating of business firms. The president also noted that, thanks to the powers that have been received and the application of investments generated by the state and Extremadura's own institutions, at present coordinated by the Extremadura Council, autonomy can without the slightest doubt make possible a better future for the region.

11,466
CSO: 3548/143

FONTAN SETS CONDITIONS FOR LIBERAL-POPULAR COALITION MERGER

Madrid ABC in Spanish 13 Dec 83 p 19

[Article by Jose A. Sentis: "Fontan Presents His Position in Favor of a Coalition at a Club; Conditions: Autonomous Communities and the Constitution"]

[Text] As a representative of the liberal movement, Antonio Fontan last night announced his position in favor of admitting the liberals into the Popular Coalition and proposed as conditions for doing so a "pledge to not subject the 1978 Constitution to revision during the next legislative term," "no systematic revision of the achievements of the present government, which is a legitimate one" and the "energetic affirmation of Title 8," which deals with the autonomous communities.

During a talk given at the Liberal Club of Madrid, the man who was president of the Senate and minister during the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government assured us that "an election coalition with the Center and the Right is the most coherent and sensible option for Spanish liberals in the face of the confrontation we will be up against in 1985 or 1986." Fontan went on to say that, along with the conditions cited for their joining, he definitely felt that such a revision was possible inasmuch as it was necessary "for ideological, technical or operational reasons," included among which are the "promotion of private initiative" and the "restoration of freedoms that may have been eroded because of the socialist policy." Fontan included among others those having to do with freedom of education, of expression and other public freedoms, and of legal safeguards — with regard to "habeas corpus" or the inviolability of one's home, for example.

Antonio Fontan feels that it is possible to reach an election accord and to agree on a joint government program between the liberals and those parties which at present constitute the Popular Coalition (AP [Popular Alliance]-PDP [People's Democratic Party] and UL [expansion unknown]) and, in support of this possibility, he assumes the position that the liberal movement is not sufficiently represented in Fraga's party. Fontan appears to be opting for a federation of liberals, not for joining the UL. The talk, which Fontan within the framework of a "policy of actions" combined with the supper he afterwards shared with the chairman of the AP at the Club del Sable, was one which, in the opinion of liberals close to Fontan, implies a significant union between

two different political sources: "Between the man who was the manager of the daily, MADRID, and the minister of information and tourism at the time."

During his talk at the club, the chairman of the AP asserted that socialism is contrary to a system of liberties because it kills freedom, "and the latter is the heritage of liberal thought." Manuel Fraga listed the attacks on freedom committed by the socialist government; Parliament, administration, religion, television, "a surprising majority in the Supreme Court,... freedom is not growing in Spain. We cannot expect anything else."

The reason for this coalition is explained on the basis of the current Spanish political situation, in which one party retains almost supreme power: "The coalition is an affair of state. It is not a question of a race for power or a problem of personal ambitions," he maintained; rather "it is necessary that it be possible for the socialists to lose out too, that they not turn into another PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, in Mexico)."

Fontan also feels that this is a time when definitions based on strategy, on method, like the one Roca y Garrigues' Reformist Party is, in his opinion, advocating, are not enough. For him it is a matter of an ideological definition and there is no place in it for "the old issue of two separated and incompatible Spains."

The entry of the members of the liberal movement — or of the great majority of them — into the coalition is considered to be imminent by the members of that ideological movement.

11,466
CSO: 3548/143

VREVEN'S PERSONNEL PLAN FOR 1984-1986 CRITICIZED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Nov 83 pp 19-25

[Article by Frank de Moor: "The Generals Ask, the Minister Responds"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] Minister of Defense Vreven has drawn up a personnel plan for the Department of Defense. There is clearly talk of a missed opportunity.

Defense Minister Freddy Vreven (PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress]) has managed so far to keep out of harm's way. The dossiers involving the Department of Defense either developed into government matters or were simply handled privately.

This was the case for plans concerning the deployment of new nuclear warhead missiles and the replacement of Mirage fighters by F-16's as well as the purchase of new American 155 millimeter guns.

The actively debated dossier concerning the replacement of 2,500 light terrain vehicles (4x4) fits into that first category, and it clearly showed -- for those who were not aware of it yet -- what Defense Minister Vreven is worth.

/The 1984-1986 Personnel Plan for the Department of Defense/, which Minister Vreven has been talking about since the beginning of 1982 (although in different versions), has become -- pending the purchase of 48 helicopters for the army -- the dossier about which he has personally come under fire now.

As has become well known since then, on 4 November (as usual) Vreven's personnel plan was published by the BELANG VAN LIMBURG, and a few hours later it was referred to an interdepartmental working group by the Council of Ministers. This working group will meet next week. However, there is already every indication that at least the representatives of the Departments of Finance, Public Service, Budget and Internal Affairs could make things extremely difficult for their colleague from the Department of Defense.

The personnel plan cannot stand up to analysis and is clearly a missed opportunity to improve the army's readiness more thoroughly than Vreven is really proposing.

To begin with, the plan is based on an untruth, and on the misjudgement of a (confidential, but, in particular, hidden away) study, which had been drawn up in February 1982 in the Department of Defense itself. It shows that, all in all, the (4,500) additional conscripts the minister wants to take on could well threaten to become much more expensive to the treasury than the (3,000) temporary regular volunteers he wants to get rid of.

Thus, in the current economic situation, a conscript apparently costs the state between 115,374 and 178,158 francs more because other ministries, such as the Ministries of Finance (through lower income) and Social Affairs (through higher expenses), will also have to bear the burden. As a matter of fact, statisticians claim that conscripts in the service cannot necessarily, if at all, be replaced by unemployed individuals, and that thus a number of cumulative effects occur which the Vreven plan clearly does not take into account.

The following table, intended for the Council of Ministers, clearly illustrates the costs and benefits (in millions of francs) of the Vreven operation. It shows primarily that, when you balance sub-totals 4 and 8 for 1984, 1985 and 1986, the so-called personnel plan will result in additional expenses of 515, 490 and 63 million francs respectively. In the end, the so-called plan will apparently only yield 25 and 451.4 million francs respectively in 1985 and 1986. Hence, the question certainly remains of whether it is worth the trouble to set up an otherwise defective plan.

Implementation

However, Defense Minister Vreven hopes to be able to free more financial resources with his plan -- which was primarily inspired by the top army leadership --, and then to add those to the army's operational costs. As he wrote in his memorandum to the Council of Ministers, "the obvious solution then is to free resources from the personnel sector."

This sector currently absorbs 50 percent of the budget for the Department of Defense, while the operational and investment costs require 25.4 and 24.6 percent respectively and cannot, according to the Department of Defense, be compressed any further. And this is probably also due to the fact that everyone has gradually come to realize that even though the Belgian army has all kinds of nice equipment, it barely has the money to pay for it, let alone to use it.

The juggling which has taken place in recent years with part of the operational costs, to the benefit of personnel and investments, has only worsened the situation. All the more so as virtually all purchases, such as among other things the armored infantry combat vehicles, now cost double the amount they did at the time the contract was signed.

The failure of the so-called /professionalization/ of the army has in turn further undermined its readiness.

Table: Plan 1984-1986 - Financial Balance Sheet with Wage Moderation

Hypothese : 25.500 B4 einde 1986 duur van de diensttijd : 10/8	(1)	1984	1985	1986
1. Herstructureren van de Luchtverdediging (Nike) B4 (vrijwilligers) B5 (dienstplichtigen)	(2)	— 50 Mio (12) — 33 Mio	— 150 Mio — 66 Mio — 375 Mio + 79 Mio	— 200 Mio — 66 Mio — 1.025 Mio + 186 Mio (1)
2. Vermindering B4 (konversie B4/B5)	(3)			
3. Verhoging kontingensten dienstplichtigen	(4)			
4. Subtotaal 1 tot 3 : besparingen	(5)	— 83 Mio	— 512 Mio	— 1.105 Mio
5. Normalisatie van de prestaties	(6)	+ 474 Mio	+ 753 Mio	+ 725 Mio
6. Soldij (verhoging in de middenzone (x 2) en verre zone (x 3) + een ticket NMBS per week)	(7)	+ 124 Mio	+ 249 Mio	+ 249 Mio + 194,6 Mio
7. Andere maatregelen ten voordele van het personeel	(8)			
8. Subtotaal 5 tot 7 : meeruitgaven	(9)	+ 598 Mio	+ 1.002 Mio	+ 1.168,6 Mio
9. Loonmatiging	(10)	— 515 Mio	— 515 Mio	— 515 Mio
10. Balans	(11)	—	— 25 Mio	— 451,4 Mio
(13) (1) Zonder verhoging van de kontingensten om de verliezen te kompenseren.				

Key:

1. Assumption: 25,500 B4 by the end of 1986
Length of service: 10/8
2. Restructuring of air defense (Nike)
B4 (volunteers)
B5 (conscripts)
3. Reduction B4 (conversion B4/B5)
4. Increase contingents of conscripts
5. Sub-total 1 through 3 (savings)
6. Normalization of performance
7. Pay (increase in middle zone [x2] and far zone [x3] plus an NMBS [National Belgian Railroads] ticket per week)
8. Other measures to benefit the personnel
9. Sub-total 5 through 7: additional expenses
10. Wage moderation
11. Balance
12. Million
13. Without increase of the contingents to compensate for the losses.

Defense Minister Vreven wants to reduce gradually the current number (in his opinion expensive) of volunteers through retrenchment from 28,500 to 25,500. That is much less than the top army leadership ever wanted, but still more than is shown by a simple calculation. Indeed, according to statistical tables from the Department of Defense, by the end of 1982 there were still 32,500 volunteers. Hence, the proposal which has in the meantime been given the name of Minister Vreven, is apparently already /being implemented/.

As is known, by 1986 he also wants to replace the volunteers which have been retrenched by 4,500 conscripts, to grant the remaining regular servicemen a 38 hour work week, to pay them overtime instead of compensating them with time off, to pay a couple dozen extra francs here and there and also to provide a few additional financial benefits to the conscripts.

The possibility has even been provided for allowing servicemen, following the customary service period (10 months in Belgium and 8 months in the FRG) to remain in the service for an extra 2 or 4 month period, but then as wage earners.

In addition, the conscripts' pay in the FRG would also be doubled or tripled, depending on how far away the barracks are. Hence, quite a number of additional expenses, which the Department of Defense has estimated at 598 million francs for 1984, at 1.002 billion francs for 1985, and at 1.1686 billion francs for 1986.

According to its own calculations, the Department of Defense hopes to finance this operation by:

- eliminating the Belgian /Nike/ air defense missile squadrons in the FRG, thus withdrawing from this NATO defense belt (as the /NATO Long Term Defense Program/ itself actually suggested), and putting the air force personnel to work elsewhere;
- being allowed to keep the proceeds from the projected wage moderation (1.545 billion francs up to and including 1986) for itself.

More Marches

It is very doubtful that all of this will produce a /zero operation/ as of 1 July 1984, as claimed by Defense Minister Vreven and the generals in the memorandum to the Council of Ministers. People in the know even claim that the Vreven plan will be an expensive affair.

All the more so as it will definitely not make the army any better operationally speaking. Even if the memorandum to the Council of Ministers notes that a number of non-operational functions will be reduced and certain structures eliminated.

When questioned by us in that respect, (Lieutenant Colonel) Joel De Smet, chief of staff of the Department of Defense, had to admit that the proposed cuts would take place /only among the soldiers/, and that the ministry is leaving it up to the general staffs to determine how many and where non-operational functions and structures will be eliminated. However, this immediately

poses one of the main problems of the Belgian army, which the staffs will certainly never recognize officially.

Not more than half of the servicemen (only four-tenths of the officers and non-commissioned officers) are assigned to combat units, and even then a large number among them are no longer operational, given their age and the lack of reclassification opportunities outside the army.

This even gives our army Latin American airs, as a high level officer recently remarked /in private/. There are 44 generals and 1,600 colonels, barely one-fourth of whom hold leadership functions in combat units. Too many officers and non-commissioned officers "confuse the wearing of a uniform (if they wear it) with being a soldier," and have created a life-size lack of cadres.

The Vreven plan does not solve this either. On the contrary. Chief of staff De Smet believes that the cadres can be strengthened, for example, by eliminating time recuperation as a means of payment, and by really compensating overtime. This would have to occur according to their own system of compensation in which (depending on the gross annual income) about 4 to 44 francs are paid per hour of overtime.

It is more than obvious that the non-commissioned officers, for example, who until now have earned quite a bit more moonlighting during their recuperation periods, are not served at all by the elimination of this form of compensation, and even less by the introduction of such starvation wages. Hence, an officer involved with personnel policy predicts even greater absenteeism than now.

All of this, and much more, such as additional marches to motivate the troops, is thus very far removed from a personnel plan worthy of that name. As a matter of fact, Minister Vreven leaves everything structurally untouched. It goes even further; he even asks the Council of Ministers to change the militia legislation -- understand by this the law on exemptions -- precisely to offer more soldiers to the top army leadership. The fact that, within the proposed personnel plan, these soldiers are likely to serve only as cannon fodder, is apparently something the Department of Defense will have to be concerned about.

8463
CSO: 3614/21

ANXIETY OVER REFORM IMPACT ON MILITARY'S 'POLITICAL' ROLE

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 16 Nov 83 p 11

[Text] In trying to lend a hand to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in a matter of fundamental importance, the newspaper YA did a disservice to Spain in the process. YA endeavored to justify and defend the budding military reform, even knowing full well that its argument was untenable, an argument to which a statement by a classic such as Villamartin, in his "Nociones de arte militar" [Concepts of Military Art], could be applied: "The fatal mania of imitation has brought Spain two great ills: first, exaggerating our weakness and greatly overestimating the strength of other nations; second, being unpardonably ignorant from the standpoint of our military skills. For the most part, our doctrine and regulations have not been derived from our own experience, but translated from foreign publications."

Villamartin's denunciation goes beyond the military sphere. For example, it also applies to politics. The fatal mania of imitation, which has rendered 10 constitutions futile since 1812, is also dangerously afflicting the present one, as events have set about to demonstrate with natural alacrity. The allusion to the doctrinal foreignness of the present constituent system, which includes both a liberal and a Marxist system, is not wasted. This dangerous constitutional ambiguity was made clear some days ago by someone so unsuspected of caprices against the present regime as Pedrol Rius and is further demonstrated by the constant appeals to the Constitutional Court, as well as the difficulties of interpretation being encountered by its magistrates. References to the 1978 constitution to justify opinions so disconcerting as YA's regarding military reform demand great caution, not only legal but moral as well. The latter most strictly requires a periodic confession, since for a Catholic, as the pope has said over and over again, the moral bases of the national conscience are above positive law, including constitutions.

As a sequel to Villamartin, it could be said that neither the present model of democracy nor its military policy have been derived from our own experience or our rich traditions, in harmony with Hispanic cultural keys, but that they are awkward translations of foreign models, in contradiction to the deep sentiments of the people and the military establishment. The author of YA's editorial, perhaps overly concerned with his occupational choices, may possibly have a different conception of the circumstances than Villamartin and other military science classics. But in a matter of such serious importance, it is impossible to use subjectivity, no matter how much it may form the core of the system.

The socialist government defends the META [expansion unknown] plan's reform. This is difficult to accept, since the META plan, as many military officers know, is still in the stage of preparation, with many of its features being studied and various choices being considered. The reform also concerns only one part of the plan, although it is of the greatest importance. The haste in making a draconian decision concerning that part, and the circumstances under which the government made the decision, reflect a political urgency that is hardly appropriate for such an extremely delicate matter. It calls attention to the fact that the assassination of an army captain and the arrest in France of another captain and two sergeants, sent on a mission completely inappropriate to their status, are being used for a hasty military reform while the new legal instrument for the antiterrorist campaign, which the prime minister promised to submit to parliament in 10 days and besides the fact that it is stingy, is being postponed on the pretext that it must be issued by the High Judicial Council. Then why wasn't the military-reform draft law, less necessary and requiring as much or more meticulousness, submitted beforehand to the Supreme Council of Military Justice and to the collegial organs of the three armed services? Or is it that the urgency is dictated exclusively by the supposed fear of the truthfulness of the campaigns of intoxication which, concerning a "preventive" coup, recall certain methods of social manipulation at the request of certain departments, dependent on those who subsequently seek protection within them in order to make the armed forces totally dependent on the government?

With regard to the chain of command of the armed forces, the experts involved in the META plan have worked primarily with two models: the U.S. model, comparable to the present structure of the Council of Chiefs of Staff, and the European model, which adopts the socialist government's military reform only in appearance. And we say only in appearance for the simple reason that there are notable differences in constitutional coverage and in political practices derived therefrom. The current constitutional order in the state of the autonomies is the result of a peculiar consensus of interests, whose beginning dates back to 1941, as ABC recently endeavored to confirm. But it is also the result of a very odd process, by virtue of which it was necessary to make the monarchy's legitimacy, as set forth in the Law of Succession, compatible with the establishment of a new parliamentary system. This compromise is particularly noticeable in the constitution's treatment of the armed forces. Those who have studied it from the standpoint of comparative law can only cite two precedents for the content of Article 8, as evidenced by their inclusion in the "Preamble": The 1967 Organic Law of the State and the powers of the Revolutionary Council in the Portuguese Constitution. Something similar can be cited in relation to Article 62, which grants the king, without any qualifications, "supreme command of the armed forces." Actually, the constitution grants the king an authority over the armed forces similar to that held by his predecessor, General Franco. We find this to be sufficiently clear.

Nor is the reference by YA's editorialist appropriate concerning the story of the correction which Romanones made to King Alfonso XIII. Paragraph f) of Article 62, which deals with the same matter, also provides evidence of a compromise similar to that previously mentioned. The king is granted power to "issue the decrees approved by the Council of Ministers, to award civilian and military jobs and to confer honors and distinctions in accordance with

law." Is it only a question of poor wording, thanks to which the awarding of jobs is free of any conditions, or a contrived ambiguity, forced by the compromise? Apart from the fact that the authority of supreme command in the Spanish language can only be interpreted as being equivalent to full authority, it is significant that among the powers granted to the government and to the administration in Section IV, there is no reference at all to the armed forces, although there is a reference to "security forces and bodies" (Article 104). The omission cannot be considered unusual or the result of an unpardonable oversight, but rather a result of the natural consistency with Articles 8 and 62, the only ones in which the constitution expressly refers to the armed forces. It is sufficiently clear that for all purposes, from institutional to operative purposes, the constitution grants clear autonomy to the armed forces, under the supreme command of the king, and thus directly. Only for administrative purposes can attributes of an obvious nature be implied to be conferred on the Ministry of Defense, even to a lesser extent than those previously conferred on the Ministries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to which the Organic Law of the State refers, a reference no longer present in the 1978 constitution. YA's argument also falters in this respect. In the national government, the High General Staff fulfills clear functions in the chain of command, whose supreme executive authority corresponds to the chief of state and general of the armed forces. We emphasize that there is no doubt that the 1978 constitution transferred similar powers to the king, powers which the prime minister and minister of defense are now trying to take away from him through a reform with notable unconstitutional aspects.

But the reasons for uneasiness and confusion do not end there. The constitution's ambiguity leads to another difference that is resulting in exceptionally grave contradictions. While the mission, semantically far beyond powers and attributes, assigned to the armed forces and, therefore, to the king has to do with Spain, the functions corresponding to the government are related to the state. And while Spain has a unitarian dimension, as implied by Article 8, the conception of the state is ambiguous and evanescent, to the extent that even in subsequent legal writings there are explicit references to the state of the autonomies, an expression which does not appear in the constitution. It gives the impression to any distant scholar that, precisely in view of the fear of fleeting temptations which could result from the general acceptance of nationalities and of the vague Section VIII, concerning autonomies, the drafters of the constitution were concerned and cautious enough to assign to two institutions independent of partyocratic changes--the crown and the armed forces under its supreme command--the extremely delicate and high mission of "guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of Spain, defending its territorial integrity and constitutional order." It is obvious that even beyond the Constitutional Court, which has certain powers, the mission of guaranteeing the constitutional order, including possible and irreparable deviations of the parliament, the government and the constitutional court, is assigned in the final analysis to the armed forces under the supreme command of the king. It should also be remembered that this status was expressly acknowledged to the king by the leaders of the parties with the most obvious parliamentary representation, including the PSOE, immediately after 23 February. Nor is it pointless to cite the emphasis and solemnity with which members of parliament, government and parties, individuals and newspapers, including YA, proclaimed that the transition to democracy was possible thanks to the

attitude of the armed forces. Is it possible to imagine that such praise referred to the fact that the armed forces, which were responsible for victory and thus for the legitimacy of the present form of democracy, derived from the Law of Political Reform, could have paralyzed the process? It is more accurate to admit that such acclamations, which were totally unsolicited, implicitly recognized that the armed forces chose at that time to exercise the mission assigned to them with regard to possible interpretative transgressions of the Law of Political Reform.

EL ALCAZAR is not in the habit of making unjust criticism. As we have no partisan or factional ties, we are motivated solely by the desire for possible better service to Spain and the Spanish people. Nor are we viscerally opposed to the present system and its agencies, nor are we politically subservient to it, even though we try to comply scrupulously with the law. But in relation to all this, we do not relinquish our right to the proper exercise of criticism through the use of the best resources of our function as journalists. It is precisely this critical sense which gives us cause for alarm concerning the content and possible consequences of the hasty military reform undertaken by the government, when the most pressing matter was to establish a rigorous mechanism for combating terrorism, most of whose victims are specifically members of the armed forces.

The application of Villamartin's distant denunciation of the current situation should take into account, as prestigious writers on political law, constitutional law and philosophy of law have done, the fact that the foreign sources of inspiration of the 1978 constitutionalists, and we are not referring to specific parties, undoubtedly included the Soviet model. And since the conduct of the dominant majority implies in practice the subordination of the state to the party, the objective result of the budding military reform involves the total subordination of the armed forces to the program of the party in power, in this instance the socialist party, a deviation which directly violates the mission assigned to the armed forces by Article 8 of the constitution. Some commands resulting from the almost total autonomy of the Ministry of Defense regarding promotions and assignment of posts, for example, not only introduces disturbing factors for politicization of commands, which are subject to a similar revision if the governing party changes, but also, by its very nature, violates the spirit of the military, whose principal merit, the essence of the principle of authority, lies in better service to Spain. Digging into the problem would be equivalent to accepting the formal arguments submitted by YA to justify the reform. Our duty, however much it may upset the editorial's author and his professional aspirations and political commitments, consists of establishing the truth, and doing so honestly and courageously. Finally, and we regret having to remind YA of this, we are trying to be loyal to the standards of conduct which the pope urged us to follow during his tour of this battered country of Spain, which has given us our reason to live and whose values we intend to defend, to the full extent of the strength and courage which God has given us.

11915
CSO: 3548/109

MILITARY

SPAIN

ALLOCATIONS TO OVERHAUL ROTA NAVAL BASE

Madrid YA in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Jose Luis Medina]

[Text] Jerez de la Frontera--The Rota base is going to be the Spanish Navy's most important because the Combat Group, the Amphibious Command and the Navy Division of the Civil Guard are going to be stationed there. The base's facilities are going to be overhauled and remodeled to this end. Work began this week with the launching of the first caisson for the 400-meter extension of the existing pier. The caisson has been dubbed the "Rear Admiral Saenz de Buruaga." He is the man who has been pushing the project and will be relieved as commander of the Rota Naval Base on the 19th by Rear Adm Jose Tomas Sanchez Ocana. The Public Works Ministry will invest some 1.3 billion pesetas in this pier, which will be completed in 13 months.

The pier will consist of 15 caissons, each of which will be 28.7 meters long, 15 meters high and 11 meters wide. They are constructed of reinforced concrete and because they have hollow interiors, they float until they are filled with gravel and concrete, whereupon they sink to the seabed.

The Spanish Navy will thus have greater docking capacity at the Rota base and be able to station there its Combat Group and Amphibious Command units, which are currently in Cadiz. The Navy Division of the Civil Guard is presently in San Fernando.

8743

CSO: 3548/152

MADRID IN CONSORTIUM FOR NEW FIGHTER

Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 25

[Text] Madrid--The Air Force Chiefs of Staff of five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) have reached an agreement for the joint manufacture of a new European fighter aircraft that will enter service in the mid-1990's.

The Air Force General Headquarters reported on the agreement in an official note early this afternoon, saying that "on 16 December 1983 at the air base in Cologne (Germany), the Air Force Chiefs of Staff of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom reached an agreement on the common objective of building the future European fighter aircraft (ACA)." The document lists the agreed upon specifications of the new fighter: it must be a single-seater, two-engine aircraft with great maneuverability and short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability. It will go into service in the mid-1990's.

Missions

"The aircraft," the communique goes on to say, "will be able to perform air defense and air-to-surface attack missions. Nevertheless, air-to-air mission capability must be the main consideration in the design of the aircraft. An effort will be made to keep the overall cost and, therefore, development costs, as low as possible, in other words, low research, development and procurement costs."

"The national armaments directors of the five nations will be informed simultaneously so that the feasibility study can begin and the industries can draft their proposals in accordance with military requirements. After the five Staffs evaluate the industry proposals, the findings will be submitted to the ministers for their approval and further action."

The main goal of the ACA (Maneuverable Fighter Aircraft) program is to replace, early next century, the F-16's, Mirage F-1's and Phantoms that have been the backbone of Western Europe's air defense. It also aims at continued European cooperation in military aviation, the main example of which has been the Panavia Tornado, the Anglo-Italian-German fighter-bomber that competed in Spain with the F-18-A. The French aeronautical industry, which is one of the largest in the world and had always competed on its own on the world market, is part of the ACA program.

MILITARY

SPAIN

ECOLOGISTS HAMPER CABANEROS BOMB RANGE PURCHASE

Madrid YA in Spanish 17 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Fernando Rueda]

[Text] Reliable sources have told YA that after pressure from environmental and peace groups and in particular from the socialist government of Castile-La Mancha, the Defense Ministry has decided not to become involved in the purchase of the Cabaneros bomb range and to shift the responsibility to the Council of Ministers.

Air Force circles decline to comment on the matter, inasmuch as they feel that Narciso Serra is the one who should take a firm stand on the issue. They are saying only that they need a bomb range, be it in Ciudad Real or anywhere else in Spain.

It bears mentioning in this regard that the defense minister has decided to keep out of circulation a publicity pamphlet that has already been printed up (at the suggestion of the director general of Defense Information and Social Relations, Luis Reverter) and that argues for the purchase of Cabaneros. The minister felt that the pamphlet was inappropriate.

Using a great many photographs and comparative charts, the pamphlet tries to show that the civilian population, animals and vegetation are quite safe near the bomb range that would be utilized by the F-18A's that the government decided to buy this past 30 May from the American company MacDonnell Douglas.

In contrast to Reverter's rejected proposal, a quite different initiative has met with great success. In Ciudad Real the autonomous socialist government has organized a drawing contest for children in connection with the Cabaneros bomb range to make people aware of the dire consequences for the entire region of having an air force bombing range so nearby.

The Council of Ministers will make the decision, and all indications are that the votes that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] might lose by approving the Cabaneros plan will carry more weight than the air force's needs.

A Difficult Decision

Ever since it was learned that the Defense Ministry intended to purchase the Cabaneros property, environmental groups, the Communist Party and the PSOE, which was in the opposition at the time, have been harshly opposed to the plan.

They argued and continue to argue that the bombing would destroy the fauna and flora and endanger the lives of the residents of nearby towns and that the noise would frighten livestock and make life unpleasant for the local populace.

Most local residents agree with these arguments, and thus Narciso Serra's initial intention to purchase the land in the Los Montes district prompted an antisocialist reaction in Ciudad Real, which the president of Castile-La Mancha had to try to counter by pressuring the administration not to carry the project forward.

The Socialist administration did not take into consideration the Communist Party's suggestion that Congress appoint a commission of experts to investigate Cabaneros and all alternate fields so that a final decision could be made based on its findings.

The decision is now up to the Council of Ministers, which does not seem too interested in making a prompt determination that will inevitably displease either the air force or the authorities in Castile-La Mancha.

8743
CSO: 3548/152

ECONOMIST GIVES MIXED REVIEW OF CYPRIOT STATUS

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 18 Nov 83 pp 1,10

[Speech by Dr. Giorgos Vasileiou at a banquet at the Nicosia Lions Club]

[Text] The Cypriot economy presents two aspects. The first, which every visitor sees, is very positive; a building boom, six-percent inflation, large and increasing tourist flow, relatively small percentage of unemployment, high standard of living. But from here spring all the problems which the other side presents; from the fact that we have succeeded in offering ourselves an average standard of living much higher than that which would be justified based on the country's productive capacities. That is, we spend more than we earn. This difference is manifested by the deficit in the balance of payments on current account, which is being covered with constant borrowing from abroad. Thus, the foreign debt is increasing steadily and to a dangerous point.

Basic Problems

The Cypriot economy is facing three basic problems:

1. The first, and most significant, is that the state budget constantly shows a deficit and, especially, that the deficit is tending to increase from year to year. From around 70 million in 1981-1982, this year the deficit will be on the order of 100 million and the 1984 budget anticipates a deficit of approximately 120 million pounds. Such a deficit creates inflationary pressures, it is converted to a demand for products which must be imported, and so it leads to an increased deficit in the trade balance.
2. The second basic problem springs mainly from exogenous factors. Because of the international economic recession, both our industry and our agriculture are finding very great difficulties in the sector of exports. It is well-known that many industries are exporting without profit solely to stay alive and that the prices of agricultural products are very low. Day by day, the competition is becoming more intense and more difficult since, because of the international recession, all the countries are trying to find a solution to their domestic problems with exports, and mainly to the Middle East area.
3. The third basic problem is the increasing unemployment of professional and office personnel and the shortage in the labor force. It is well-known that Cyprus

has the third highest percentage of students in the world. This would be a great advantage if our economy was in a position to absorb this relatively large number of professionals who complete the various universities every year. It does not have such possibilities at present, however. We expend huge sums in foreign exchange and create young professionals who we cannot employ and who are forced to emigrate. So Cyprus is losing the most dynamic part of its population and is creating great social problems. For a young person to study and not be able to find work in his country and be forced to leave is a tragic fact with many other negative repercussions.

How We Should Confront the Problems

Everyone agrees that maintaining a healthy economy is the prerequisite and basis for our national survival. The question posed, however, is: How should we confront the situation and what policy should we implement? Personally, I believe that there is no short-term solution to the problems we are facing today. For example, there is no way to solve in a single stroke the problem of the deficit in the state budget, foreign borrowing, etc. If we want to be realists, we must understand that, whatever solution might exist, it will not be short-term but long-term. Therefore what is of significance today is not for us to search for the miraculous solution with which we will overcome all the problems from one day to the next, but to designate that correct line of economic policy which will allow us, within several years, little by little, with hard work and self-denial, to correct our economy's present basic weaknesses.

Since the problems we face are so serious and difficult to solve, and since success of the economic policy presumes the cooperation of everyone, it would be a blessing if the president of the republic would take the initiative to appoint a special committee in which both government and non-government factors will participate.

The committee would objectively study the status of the economy, listen to the opinions of the various organizations and parties and propose solutions and measures which the government can take. The work of this committee, which can be formed at the president's initiative, would help significantly in creating a climate of accord and national confrontation of the situation, which is an indispensable prerequisite for the success of a long-term economic policy.

Decrease in the Budget's Deficit

Unquestionably, it is necessary for efforts to be made to lower the deficit, both by decreasing expenditures and increasing income. But the margins for a solution are limited. We can neither decrease the salaries of public employees, nor increase direct or indirect taxes to such a degree that we cover the deficit. The deficit is not a result of bad management. Therefore, as long as we recognize that it is impossible to decisively solve the problem in a single stroke, we must at least strive for a gradual improving of the situation. We can achieve this mainly by putting a stop to the increase in expenditures, which can happen only if the government stops hiring new personnel for a significant period of time.

The increase in income can derive, to a certain degree, from new tax measures, but mainly from larger receipts resulting from an increase in activity and taxable income, but not in the percentage of taxation.

As long as the government is unable to hire young professionals and the thousands of secondary-school graduates who pass the government examinations, they must be absorbed by the private sector, in the various productive fields. But for the private sector to be able to employ all these young people, it must be assisted to be activated even more. The solution will not be easy but I believe that there really are possibilities both in industry and in the services.

Founding of New Industries and Promotion of Exports

The promotion and development of our exports must become a patriotic duty for everyone. If we do not succeed in increasing exports we will not be able to solve any of the basic problems we are facing. For this reason, simultaneous with the strengthening of industries in operation today, we must go on to new directions, new industries relying on modern technology. This cannot happen with Cypriot forces only. We need foreign assistance, not so much in capital as in technology. Serious efforts have not been made thus far in this direction. It is necessary for us to persuade foreign firms to cooperate with Cypriots to create new technological units which will create new possibilities for exporting industrial products.

Also, necessary in the agricultural sector are new investments, development of new crops, and especially better "marketing" not only on old, but on new markets.

Strengthening of Tourism and Services

Simultaneous with the efforts to increase industrial and agricultural exports, even greater importance must be given to increasing receipts from tourism and services. In the field of tourism, we have sufficient margins for development, but it must be planned. We must create all those conditions which make the tourist feel that Cyprus really offers something more than other countries.

Even greater possibilities exist in the services sector, which is the only one which can employ a large number of professionals. It is necessary for all the professionals to become aware of the need to develop their activities mainly in the Middle East area. At the same time, the various government departments must take all the necessary measures, must begin a campaign I would say, to attract to Cyprus as many foreign companies as possible which will use Cyprus as a base for their activities, both in the Middle East and the rest of the world. The possibilities in this sector are really enormous. But a dynamic confronting of the issue with enthusiasm and imagination is needed.

Decreasing Consumption

Many people say that one way to cover the huge deficit in the trade balance which overconsumption is creating would be to impose restrictions on imports. By imposing artificial quantitative restrictions on imports, with no local industry able to cover demand, the only thing we will achieve is to create a scarcity of products, conditions for a black market and an increase in inflation. A decrease in imports can happen only with a decrease in consumption. For this, many people suggest freeing the price index. With the present conditions, however, such a suggestion is completely unrealistic. Because the general economic climate is much different from that in the fall of 1974 when workers and employees accepted a direct decrease in their incomes.

But, while it is not realistic to talk about decreasing the standard of living, we should all become aware that there are no margins for increasing the standard of living--at least for a short period of time, so we can cover part of the gap which was created with a too-rapid increase in the past. At the same time, we can pursue a related decrease in consumption by encouraging saving and with tax measures which will mainly cover luxury items.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the increase in the standard of living from now on cannot result from demands for automatic increases in salaries or in the share of profits, but must be a result of an increase in productivity and development of production and exports.

We must become aware that we can no longer ask the government to offer solutions for every problem we are facing. The stream goes up, the government should pay, it hails, the government should pay, exporters want aid, the government should pay. But where will the government find the money? To find it, it must create income. To create income, it must tax. If it taxes, the problems will become far greater. We must rely on our powers to work hard, and all together in cooperation with the government, to find a solution to our problems. The struggle will be difficult. The time for easy solutions has passed. But I believe that we have the potential of maintaining the standard of living which we created, and bettering it. Provided that we work for it.

9247
CSO: 3521/101

ACTIVITIES OF PAN-CYPRIOT LABOR FEDERATION

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 20 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] The Nicosia PEO [Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation] Branch Council met last Thursday, 17 November, and examined, among other things, the course of the organizational and economic plan in Nicosia district which is dedicated to the 19th PEO Congress.

The Nicosia PEO Trade Union Branches worked with enthusiasm and produced the following results:

1. New members: From a target of 2,430 new members, a total of 2,490 were enrolled in the branch's trade unions, thus meeting the district's target by 102.4 percent. With the new members, the total number of members on the Nicosia PEO branch's register amounts to 26,433.
2. Dues: For dues, the PEO Central Organization Office set a target for the trade unions to collect 75 percent by the 19th Congress. The Nicosia branch surpassed 75 percent, reaching 80 percent and collecting 183,633 pounds.
3. ERGATIKO VIMA: From a target of 5,500 issues, the branch's trade unions circulated an average of 5,103 every week. It should be noted that, comparing the above results with those from the corresponding period in 1982, this year's are better in all sectors.

In addition, it was announced at the Branch Council meeting that, during the period of pre-congress work, there were 310 gatherings at work places in Nicosia and at PEO branches rurally in which thousands of workers, both PEO members and non-members, took part.

It was also announced that from the lottery for voluntary contributions to PEO to cover the expenses of the 19th Congress, a sum of 12,452 pounds--from a target of 10,220 pounds--was collected, covering the target by 118.4 percent.

The Branch Council, it is stressed in a related PEO communique, unanimously agreed that all the margins and possibilities exist for covering, and more than covering, all the targets in the organizational plan. For this reason, it is making an appeal to the trade-union committees, the branch and office committees and the local committees and members of PEO to work with all their powers for the above purpose, with a goal that at the end of the year, when the plan concludes, Nicosia district will take first place.

9247

CSO: 3521/101

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

LEBANESE BANK IN CYPRUS--The governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, A. Avxendiou, yesterday approved, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Currency Control, the establishment and operation in Cyprus of a representative office of Credit Libanais S.A.L. on an overseas basis. The Credit Libanais was founded in 1961 and is the sixth largest bank in Lebanon from a standpoint of deposits. The Credit Libanais will establish a representative office in Cyprus which will be subject to the usual conditions and control imposed and exercised by the Central Bank of Cyprus. The main purpose of the representative office is to act as a link between the Central Office or the branch banks abroad and the non-permanent residents of Cyprus, with the exception of those who are of Cypriot descent. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 18 Nov 83 p 5] 9247

CSO: 3521/101

COMMENT CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT 'DICTATORSHIP' OVER UNIONS

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 11 Oct 83 p 2

/Editorial: "Dictatorship in the Trade Union Movement" /

/Text/ The union movement in Greece resembles a picture with two sides, one the diametric opposite of the other.

One side: Our "socialist" government, which leaves nothing standing in its wake, used to say that it wants to promote the democratization of unions. It pursues this goal using the well-known "one-way street" tactic, in order to subordinate workers unions to party control.

Wherever this proves not so easy, PASOK uses openly antidemocratic methods that in no way differ from the practice of fascist regimes in suppressing the true will of the workers.

The recent incidents of attempted election fraud in large trade union organizations during the elections for supervisory committees are characteristic of the oligarchical and tyrannical mentality of PASOK. In spite of its hypocritical reassurances that it desires plualism, its trademark is autocracy.

On the other hand, the workers cannot tolerate the illegal interventions of either PASOK or its companion KKE into their trade union territory; they are beginning to react, not only by denouncing these attempted intrusions, but also in other ways, as during the interventions of the Green Guards in the elections in order to influence Olympic Airlines pilots and flight engineers to vote for those persons preferred by PASOK.

The question is, why does the ruling party engage in these dictatorial methods of dealing with the unions. The answer is twofold.

First, PASOK wants to tighten its noose of control around the workers so that they will not protest or react more dynamically to their abandonment by the government, which, due to its incompetence, can do nothing for the good of this country.

Second, the failure of the government in all areas will naturally cause opposition among the workers. This has already been proven in recent elections of

union officials. And this in turn differs further proof of the deterioration of the ruling party.

PASOK thus attempts to hide the truth. To achieve this, it resorts to election fraud, to terror and to other means of interfering with free will.

Incidents brought about by PASOK's forays into union territory, when public feeling runs so high against the party, are indicative of how it intends to behave during the parliamentary elections.

Thus, measures must be taken by the official opposition party to protect trade union freedoms, which PASOK wants to brutally suppress, as well as to guarantee unfettered expression of the public will in the next elections. One solution would be for these elections to be conducted by a government that enjoys the confidence of all of the people.

12542

CSO: 3521/54

POLL SHOWS ECONOMY TOPS GREEK CONCERNS

Athens ENA in Greek 27 Oct 83 pp 10-11

Text The economic crisis and unemployment are causing increased distress to the Greek people, eclipsing all other social and national problems. This is the conclusion of a recent poll taken by ENA. And this fact determines political developments, since the basic criterion for the voting choices of 70 percent of Greeks is the government's handling of the economy.

The recent poll was taken during the period 6 to 11 October 1983 in the area of Athens and Piraeus.

To the question "Which are, in your opinion, the most important problems that the country faces and to which the government must provide solutions," respondents answered:

Economy	70 percent
Unemployment	34 percent
Health care	30 percent
Education/Training	30 percent
Foreign affairs	15 percent

Other issues such as "environmental pollution/smog," "foreign bases," and "matters of national sovereignty" were mentioned by respondents in small percentages, fluctuating around six percent.

The economic problem, however, seems to be the focus of interest.

In research conducted in the same area at the beginning of March 1983, 54 percent of respondents chose the "economic problem" as a primary issue. Today, approximately 7 months later, the percentage has risen to 70.

Unemployment is in second place with 34 percent.

We must note here at that for a large part of the population, the economic problem and unemployment are closely related.

As we can see from the table, these two issues are viewed as the most crucial by supporters of all political parties.

This is particularly noteworthy because it reveals that irrespective of political affiliation, there is public consensus about the attention and the priorities that should be given to different issues. This fact demands that the situation be handled properly by the government.

It is self-evident that the government is being judged daily on this issue and will be judged even more severely in the future. Its credibility, and its ability to handle the large problems that preoccupy the country, will finally be evaluated by the programs it will outline and the solutions it will provide in the future.

The economy and its handling have long been at the center of public interest. And precisely because the problem has continued for so long, it creates additional questions about ways to handle it and about those who are in a position to act.

Compared with the poll of March 1983, two particular issues have sprung up. In general, they concern health care and education and training. However, their appearance should not be considered sudden.

Let's not forget that the year 1983 has been designated by the government as the Year of Health, dedicated to confronting health issues. Therefore, we can say that public opinion "got the message" and now awaits the results. With regard to education and, more generally, training, this area undergoes periodic spurts in response to particular issues that arise. Certainly for younger people, but also for families with children attending both schools and universities, this area consistently remains a focus of interest.

Concern about foreign affairs shows a relative decline. Perhaps the agreement over the bases has helped to calm anxiety in this area. At any rate, KKE supporters continue to attribute more importance to these issues than the average citizen.

In general, we see that while public opinion divided its attention among many problems, interest is now concentrated in far fewer areas, emphasizing three or four issues.

This fact indicates that impatience and an increasingly critical stance toward the work and the efficiency of the government are beginning to prevail.

Technical Means Used In the Poll

The poll was carried out by Nielsen, the well-known research organization, during the period 6 to 11 October 1983 and covered the area that includes Athens and Piraeus.

A total of 700 people were polled; they were representative of the population between 16 and 64 years of age.

To select the sample, maps were used of the blocks of the area. In all, 78 locations were chosen and 9 interviews were conducted at each.

The poll was conducted by 19 researchers and 3 inspectors. These persons have special training and many years' experience in such research.

1. Most Significant Problems

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Percentage Today</u>	<u>Percentage in March 1983</u>
Economy	70	54
Unemployment	34	37
Health care	30	14
Education/Training	30	13
Foreign affairs	15	17

2. Most Significant Problems--All Respondents

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Party affiliation /figures as published/</u>					
	<u>Total</u>	<u>PASOK</u>	<u>ND</u>	<u>KKE</u>	<u>Other*</u>	<u>None</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Economy	70	70	77	72	74	65
Unemployment	34	34	34	38	32	33
Health care	30	32	26	29	33	29
Education/Training	30	30	34	26	36	31
Foreign affairs	15	13	20	18	28	13

*This would serve as the basis for a separate study

12542

CSO: 3521/54

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

MORATORIUM AGREEMENT ON PART OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA DEBT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 13 Dec 83 p 21

[Text] Madrid (EFE)--Spain and Equatorial Guinea have agreed on the granting of a 5-year moratorium to Malabo so that it may pay the 1.8 million pesetas part of the debt it has contracted with our country amounts to, a debt totaling 6 billion. That amount is insured by the CESCE (Spanish Foreign Commerce Insurance Company).

Guinean authorities have also reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to clean up the Central African country's economy before next August.

With respect to the refinancing of the debt to Spain, we have learned that the delegations of the two countries reached a settlement last Friday (Luis Tejero, vice president of the Insurance Associations syndicate, headed the Spanish negotiators). The director of the Office for Cooperation with Guinea, Salvador Bermudez de Castro, and Equatorial Guinean Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcelino Nguema, taking advantage of an operational stopover during the flight that was taking the latter to Paris, conferred with one another at the Madrid airport of Barajas on Saturday. The minister had expressed his wish to confer with his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran, before his final return to Malabo.

Nguema was recently able to discuss his country's entry into the economic area of the franc in the French capital.

11,466
CSO: 3548/141

UNDERGROUND WATER RESOURCES NATIONALIZATION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 13 Dec 83 p 15

[Article: "Another Nationalization"]

[Text] Under the provisions of the new water bill underground water would be practically nationalized. Due to the time that has intervened since its enactment, the old water law dating from 1879 has indeed already been a legal document rendered obsolete by the new requirements of the real situation. But it does not appear to be at all certain that water regulation, always such a controversial issue in Spain, may improve control if it is incorporated into the property right restrictions imposed on subsurface water, the practical expropriation of underground water resources, that is, of water which, since it is found beneath the surface of a piece of private property, has always been attached to that property.

Concentrating for the moment on the possible utilization of these underground aquifers, the initial reaction of the landowners is to under no circumstances plan on engaging in costly drilling and digging operations for water which they would in a short period of time -- there is talk of 2 years -- lose ownership of and on which they would have to pay taxes.

No one has claimed that property rights are unlimited such that the property extends to the sky and to an indefinite depth below the surface. But the nationalization of the aquifers that a plot, a small farm, an area might contain, is something quite different and much more serious. Without going any further than this, the utilization of underground water resources figures among those improvements that can be made on a farm -- and which must be made as required by law in many cases.

Year after year of drought, year after year of absolute neglect of any water policy are now being employed as a pressing argument to hastily modify nothing less than Spain's water laws. They say that these laws are obsolete. But they fail to mention the fact that, while this law has been in effect, over twice the number of dams our country had from the second century to 1940 were built in a little less than 40 years.

And now a highly debatable theory that claims that there are enough water resources in the subsoil of Madrid for the capital to rid itself of worries is

apparently inspiring a solution to Spain's water problem based on its underground water. And we naturally think that, before incorporating these matters into a legal document, they ought to be extensively discussed by the experts. This is not a subject for party dogma. It is a subject for scientific analysis. It is a matter to be discussed by technicians.

Naturally, we do not have to cite any statistics to know that most of those who have any flow of underground water on their lands, who make use of a well built at their own expense are not big landowners, but small landowners. We do not stress the fact because we think that large landowners have less right [to such water]; we do so to leave a written record of how small landowners are being oppressed and expropriated.

11,466
CSO: 3548/141

BANKS PREDICT ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR 1984

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 10 Dec 83 p 17

[Text] In the opinion of the Swiss Banking Company, Switzerland's GNP will grow by about 1.5 percent next year in real terms. After that, private and public consumption, investment activity and exports will make a positive contribution to growth.

Among other things, the large Zurich banking concern adheres to the following in its forecast:

The business upturn that has begun in North America and that is becoming evident in several other industrial countries again opens up somewhat more favorable prospects for the Swiss export industry. But since as a rule there is no increased investment until the second phase of the recovery process and the external value of the Swiss franc may still rise somewhat overall, there is no cause for excessive optimism. This is especially true for the machine industry, whose work backlog, with an average of 5.7 months, was still about 0.3 months below the level at the end of June of this year. In contrast, the outlook is better for the chemical industry and consumption-related areas such as the food industry and parts of the textile industry. For the first time since 1981, the expectation is that 1984 will bring a slight real increase in overall exports of goods.

No Substantial Decline in Total Unemployment

And for the enterprises primarily keyed to the domestic market, producers of consumer goods may register somewhat more favorable business activity in 1984 than producers of capital goods. An exception is those firms such as the representatives of the clothing industry, for example, that are facing extremely stiff competition from foreign competitors. As a whole, it is expected that Swiss industry will produce somewhat more than in 1983. Although a gradual reduction in short-time work is probable, a substantial decline in total unemployment cannot be expected, mainly for structural reasons. The unemployment rate, therefore, may remain under 1 percent, a very low level internationally.

Following the real decline of 1.6 percent in 1982 and the slight weakening again in 1983, it is expected that overall construction activity will again increase somewhat. The level of unfilled orders of the main building trade some 9 percent higher at the beginning of October 1983 compared to the previous year and the 28 percent rise in approved construction loans in the first 9 months of 1983 allow one to conclude that the upswing in housing construction will continue in 1984. One can likewise expect greater investment activity in public structural engineering. In the area of commercial and industrial construction and especially in civil engineering, on the other hand, production will decline. The pressure on building costs brought about by the intense competition may well provide important support to the demand for housing and possibly even for commercial and industrial structures in 1984. An easing of mortgage interest rates, on the other hand, should not be expected at least in the first half of 1984.

Weaker Growth in Consumption

Private consumption, which made an important contribution to stabilizing the Swiss business cycle in 1983 with surprisingly strong real growth of 1 percent, will probably increase further. Because wages will be increased only slightly on 1 January 1984 as a result of the greatly reduced inflation rate--the consumer price index at the end of October 1983 was only 1.4 percent above the previous year's level--and the unsatisfactory profits situation of many enterprises, however, private consumption expenditures may increase somewhat more slowly than in 1983. Another reason for this is the fact that households can no longer profit from a clear decline in inflation during the year. On an annual average, consumer prices may rise by 2.0 to 2.5 percent in 1984. Despite the strained financial situation of the federal government as well as numerous cantons and municipalities, public consumption will experience above-average expansion in 1984 as well. On the other side, the Swiss National Bank will doubtless continue its money-supply policy oriented toward stability.

With larger imports and exports, the 1984 deficit in the trade balance should again be near the level of the previous year at about 8 billion francs. Because no great changes are to be expected in the tourism balance and in the capital-gains balance either, the revenue balance will probably again close with a credit on the order of 4 to 5 billion francs.

9746
CSO: 3620/120

END

**END OF
FICHE**

DATE FILMED

31 Jan 1984